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Unregistered Complaints
Christine Suzanne Davik*

ABSTRACT
In March, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its highly-anticipated
decision in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
which resolved a split among U.S. Courts of Appeals concerning the point in
time when a copyright owner is first able to file suit against an alleged infringer.
While at first glance this case may merely appear to be a simple issue of statutory
interpretation, namely whether it is upon application for registration or once a
determination has been made on registration by the U.S. Copyright Office, this
Article argues this decision is a clarion call for a much-needed amendment to
the Copyright Act. Although the Court may have correctly construed the
registration prerequisite in Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, this Article
argues that neither of the two approaches before the Court was a truly
appropriate option. Alternatively, this Article proffers the requirement of
infringement must be removed entirely to properly account for technological
changes in the methods and speed by which copyrightable works are now
created, reproduced, and distributed. This will ensure that all copyright owners
are able to access the courthouse without delay, in accord with virtually every
other area of law.
Unfortunately, as it currently stands post-Fourth Estate, most U.S.
copyright owners cannot seek relief immediately upon detecting infringement of
their work. Instead, they must wait months and in some cases years for the
Copyright Office to complete its review, despite the existence of federal copyright
protection that attaches automatically upon creation of the work. As such, the
author of an unregistered work is left with a right to prevent copyright
infringement but an inability to do so. Adding to the inequities of this situation
is the fact that due to treaty obligations prohibiting formalities that stand in the
way of enforcing one’s copyright rights, owners of foreign works do not have to
comply with this registration prerequisite. Instead, these owners can proceed
directly to federal court to protect their works.
Accordingly, this Article advocates for complete removal of the registration
prerequisite. In doing so, this Article stands in stark contrast to the recent
scholarly trend in the field of copyright law advocating for more, not fewer,

* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. Many thanks to the
participants at the Texas A&M University School of Law Intellectual Property
Scholars Roundtable and the 2020 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property
Colloquium held at Santa University School of Law School for extremely valuable
comments and conversations on earlier drafts of this piece. I am also grateful to
Christine Dulac and Maureen Quinlan for their exceptional research assistance.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 19

358

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

formalities associated with one’s copyright rights. This includes calls by many
legal scholars for the “re-incentivization” of federal registration by taking away
certain rights and the availability of particular defenses as a consequence for
failing to seek an earlier copyright registration. While many of these proposals
are an understandable reaction to the significant increase in both the breadth
and depth of copyright rights over the past several decades, emphasizing
registration is not an appropriate way to achieve balance in light of the
numerous barriers to registration in its current form, especially for individual
artists or smaller entities. Consequently, after examining the various arguments
in support of and in opposition to the repeal of the registration requirement, this
Article ultimately concludes that the overwhelming advantages to eliminating
the Section 411(a) prerequisite outweigh any perceived or actual drawbacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC.1 This
much-anticipated opinion resolved the split among U.S. Courts of Appeals
concerning the point in time when a copyright owner is first able to file suit
against an alleged infringer.2 Unlike most areas of law, U.S. copyright owners
cannot simply seek relief immediately upon detecting infringement of their
work. Instead, copyright owners must ensure that they have first complied
with a peculiarity of copyright law, namely registering the work with the U.S.
Copyright Office.3
Unfortunately, the registration process can take months and in some
cases years to complete,4 thereby significantly delaying the ability of
copyright owners to stop infringement, despite federal copyright protection
existing automatically upon creation of the work.5 As such, the author of an
unregistered work is left with a right to prevent copyright infringement but an
inability to do so.6 Adding to the inequities of this situation is the fact that
owners of foreign works do not have to comply with this registration
prerequisite; instead, they can proceed directly to federal court to protect their
work.7
This incongruent treatment is the result of changes made to the
Copyright Act by Congress some thirty years ago in order to comply with the
United States’ foreign treaty obligations created by the decision to become a

1. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881
(2019).
2. See infra Part III.C (examining the Fourth Estate case in detail).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). Registration is also a prerequisite to certain
remedies for infringement, namely the ability to obtain an award of statutory damages
or attorney’s fees. See § 412. The Copyright Act provides such registration must
occur prior to the commencement of the infringement unless such registration is made
within three months after the first publication of the work in question. Id.
Additionally, unlike Section 411(a) which requires registration prior to filing suit only
for U.S. works, Section 412 makes no such distinction and is applicable to both U.S.
and foreign works. Id. While there are many strong arguments for repealing this
prerequisite as well, the cost-benefit analysis is different. As such, the concerns
associated with the continuing existence of Section 412 is beyond the scope of this
article.
4. See infra Part IV (discussing the significant increase in average processing
times of copyright applications for registration).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). This provision states in pertinent part as follows: “(a)
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id.
6. See infra Part II.B (examining the debate concerning accession to the Berne
Convention).
7. Id.
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member of the Berne Convention (“Berne”), the premier international
copyright agreement.8 More specifically, Berne provides that “the enjoyment
and the exercise of [copyright] shall not be subject to any formalities,” and
the U.S. Copyright Act’s registration requirement found in Section 411(a) was
regarded as violating this principle.9 Instead of simply repealing the
provision, Congress amended it to apply only to owners of U.S. works,
thereby creating an unfortunate double standard.10
For years, many federal courts attempted to ameliorate the unfairness of
Congress’ decision to place this additional obstacle only upon owners of U.S.
works seeking protection from copyright infringement.11 To accomplish this,
federal courts interpreted the language “no civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title” to be met
as soon as a complete application was submitted to the U.S. Copyright
Office.12 The aptly named “application approach,” allowed copyright owners
of U.S. works to effectively apply for federal copyright registration and file a
copyright infringement lawsuit on the same day. Accordingly, federal courts
adopting this approach largely equalized the ability of all copyright owners to
access the federal court system, regardless of whether the work allegedly
infringed was a U.S. work or a foreign work.
Nonetheless, not all federal courts subscribed to this line of reasoning.13
Others held that apart from the narrowly defined categories of works exempt
from Section 411(a)’s mandate, the statute was not fulfilled until the Register
of Copyrights actually registered the work.14 Consequently, courts following
the so-called “registration approach” would not allow a copyright
infringement case involving a U.S. work to proceed unless there was proof of
a federal copyright registration.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fourth Estate to ascertain
when registration occurs under the Copyright Act and thereby settle the

8. Id.; see also, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886.
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 8.
10. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.A (identifying courts and cases following the “application
approach”).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (emphasis added). To constitute a “complete
application,” deposit materials and the required filing fee would also need to be
included with the application for federal copyright registration. Id.
13. See infra Part III.B (identifying courts and cases following the “registration
approach”).
14. The exceptions to this requirement include U.S. works for which
preregistration is an option or applications for federal copyright protection that have
been refused registration. See infra Part II (analyzing these exceptions to the
traditional approach).
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dispute among U.S. Courts of Appeals on this issue.15 Ultimately, the Court
decided Section 411(a) requires more than the submission of application
materials for federal copyright registration. According to the Court,
“registration” does not take place until the Copyright Office has decided
whether a given work is entitled to registration, thus adopting the “registration
approach.”16 While the Court appears to have decided this case correctly from
a statutory interpretation standpoint, the result is exceptionally problematic.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate serves as a clarion
call for much-needed amendments to the Copyright Act. Further, it is not
enough to simply redefine “registration” to include the act of filing for a
federal copyright registration. In order to properly account for technological
changes in the methods and speed by which copyrightable works are now
created, reproduced, and distributed, all copyright owners should be able to
access the courthouse without delay. Removal of this antiquated requirement
will level the proverbial playing field between U.S. works and foreign works,
while also adding much needed international harmonization to an area of law
that Congress has repeatedly amended in previous attempts to meet this stated
objective.17 Ironically, in advocating for the repeal of Section 411(a), this
Article stands in contrast to the recent scholarly trend in the field of copyright
law advocating for more, not fewer, formalities.18
This Article begins in Part I by reviewing relevant provisions of the
Copyright Act and examining earlier, unsuccessful legislative attempts to
eliminate Section 411(a)’s registration prerequisite. Next, Part II discusses
the federal circuit court split leading to the Supreme Court’s decision.
Additionally, this section considers the unanimous opinion issued by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, including her acknowledgment that the current

15. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707
(2018).
16. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Sreet.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881,
888 (2019).
17. See infra Part II (discussing the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne
Implementation Act of 1989 passed in part to achieve harmony with the laws of other
countries, notably).
18. See infra Part IV.D; see also, e.g., Amanda Reid, Claiming the Copyright, 34
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 427 (2016) (“One way to check and re-balance the
interests of copyright holders and users is with formalities.”); Michael W. Carroll, A
Realist Approach to Copyright Law’s Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1511,
1513, 1516–16 (2013) (“This Article joins in the general move in favor of increased
public formalities . . . . [As others] have previously elaborated, formal requirements,
such as publication-with-notice, registration, deposit, and renewal or maintenance,
serve a variety of functions that align with copyright law’s principal economic goal of
providing authors, publishers, and their investors with potential profits for culturally
appealing works.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 312
(2010) (Examining the “current vogue for ‘reformalizing copyright’” and discussing
how “formalities, long lamented in U.S. copyright commentary, have now garnered
favor . . . .”).
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situation is “unfortunate” and “has not worked as Congress likely
envisioned.”19 Part III analyzes the numerous arguments in support of and in
opposition to the repeal of the registration requirement. Ultimately, this
Article concludes the overwhelming advantages to amending Section 411(a)
outweigh any perceived or actual drawbacks.

II. CONTINUAL CONGRESSIONAL CHANGE TO SECTION 411(A)
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.”20 The types of works covered by
copyright law are exceptionally broad and include photographs, computer
programs, musical compositions, and architectural works.21 As mentioned
above, copyright protection exists instantly upon creation of the work and
automatically provides the owner with a comprehensive set of exclusive rights
such as reproduction, distribution, and public performance or display.22
Consequently, anyone who violates these rights is an infringer of the
copyright.23 Nevertheless, the Copyright Act does not allow the copyright
owner to immediately enforce these rights.24

A. Promulgating Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act
In connection with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,
Congress made several changes to earlier law concerning the ability of a
copyright owner to bring suit for infringement. However, eliminating the
necessity of a federal registration was not one of them. As the House Report
accompanying the 1976 revisions affirmed:
19. Fourth Estate, 139 S.Ct. at 892.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). The U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes Congress
to promulgate laws in this subject area. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Specifically,
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power to “secur[e] for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”). Id.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). The full list of protectable categories of works is as
follows: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. Id.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018); see also Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887; Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003).
23. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (17 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) (2018)).
24. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. This stands in sharp contrast to
another major form of intellectual property, namely trademark law. The Lanham Act
allows owners of federal trademarks to file an infringement claim without first seeking
a registration through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This dichotomy is
problematic as it is not uncommon for a trademark infringement suit to also include
copyright claims. See infra Part IV.C.3 (examining this contrast in more detail).
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The first sentence of Section 411(a) restates the present statutory
requirement that registration must be made before a suit for copyright
infringement is instituted. Under the bill, as under the law now in
effect, a copyright owner who has not registered his claim can have a
valid cause of action against someone who has infringed his copyright,
but he cannot enforce his rights in the courts until he has made
registration.25

Instead, the changes were largely limited to issues surrounding the
procedures for filing a copyright infringement suit in cases where the owner
of a work had attempted to register it, but the application was eventually
denied by the Register of Copyrights.26 Many courts interpreted the precursor
to Section 411(a) as still requiring the owner to obtain the registration
certificate, and this entailed bringing a mandamus action against the
Registrar.27 Only after this step was complete could the owner of the refused
work proceed with the lawsuit.28 To alleviate the continued need to follow
such a convoluted practice, Section 411(a) also incorporated the following
language: “[If] registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.”29 Moreover, additional
language was included to clarify that the presence or absence of the Register
of Copyright in a particular suit would not impact the ability of the case to go
forward.30
Notwithstanding Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, many of the
more progressive modifications were made with a view toward possible
membership in the Berne Convention.31 The Berne Convention was, and still
is, regarded as the “most respected international copyright treaty.”32 Berne
dates from 1886 and, even prior to the United States joining, included close

25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), 1976 WL 14045.
26. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 164; Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 890.
27. See e.g., Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1958).
28. Id.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
30. Id. Accordingly, the last line of Section 411(a) now includes the following
language: “The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with
respect to the issue of registrability within sixty days after such service, but the
Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
determine that issue.” Id.
31. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 21 (1988) (“It can safely be stated that Congress
drafted and passed the 1976 Act with a “weather eye” on Berne.”); see also Hearings
on Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Before the Subcomm. On Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 664-87 (1988) [hereinafter House Berne Hearings] (statement of Paul L.
Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
32. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 11 (1988).
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to 100 members.33 The signatories represented an exceptionally diverse
grouping of countries with the United States notably absent.34 As the Director
General of the World Intellectual Property Organization, the global
organization that administers the Convention, stated in 1986 on the occasion
of the treaty’s 100th Anniversary, “the absence of the United States of America
from the Berne Union has, from the very beginning, been considered as
regrettable . . . For the continued strength and further development of the
Berne Union, United States membership would be of great significance.”35
The objective “of the Berne Union [is the] development of ‘effective and
harmonious’ copyright laws among all nations.”36 In order to achieve these
goals, Berne requires its members’ domestic copyright laws to meet
prescribed minimum levels of protection and prohibits most formalities. The
Berne Convention defines a “formality” as the imposition of a governmental
precondition for the “enjoyment [or] exercise” of a copyright owner’s rights.37
Many formalities were viewed as problematic because they created barriers to
obtaining copyright protection or resulted in the inadvertent loss of protection.
Even though numerous changes were made to copyright law in connection
with the passage of the 1976 Act, some formalities nevertheless remained.38
Areas of potential non-compliance included the requirement of copyright

33. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 8. The Convention has been revised seven times since it was originally
concluded. Id. This includes Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Berne (1914), Rome (1928),
Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967), and the current version Paris (1971). Id.
34. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2 (1988). The actual number was 77 members and
included “most of the free market countries, a number of developing nations, and
several nations of the Eastern Bloc.” Id.
35. Arpad Bogsch, The First Hundred Years of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 22 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 291, 298–99 (1986) https://www.w
ipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/120/wipo_pub_120_1986_09.pdf [perma.cc/28E
T-YFRT]
36. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20 (1988).
37. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 12 (1988), citing Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 8, at art. 5(2).
38. There were varying degrees of disagreement between experts and the reports
of both the House and Senate concerning the extent to which U.S. law still needed to
be altered for Berne membership. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 40 (1988) (“The
Committee received conflicting testimony about the nature of the prohibited
formalities.”). This divergence of opinion is reflected in the many different hearings
and eventual bills introduced in Congress attempting to potentially reconcile U.S. law
with the requirements of the Berne Convention. See e.g., Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1986, S. 2904, 99th Cong. (1986); Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, S. 1301, 100th Cong. (1988); Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1987, S. 1971, 100th Cong. (1987); Berne Implementation Act
of 1988, H.R. 4262, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 100-568). In
comparison to some of the other implementation bills, H.R. 4262 took a “minimalist”
approach while S. 1301 proposed quite substantial revisions.
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notice39 and, most relevant to this Article, the necessity of federally registering
one’s copyright before bringing a legal action for infringement of the work.

B. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
Despite more than a century of intransigence, it became increasingly
clear that the benefits of U.S. membership in the Berne Convention
outweighed the purported onus of compliance.40 This was due in large part to
the increasing importance of intellectual property to the U.S. economy.41 In
the mid-to-late 1980s, the United States was experiencing substantial trade
deficits in most categories of goods and services.42 However, this was not the
case with regard to copyrighted works, as the United States had become the
world’s largest exporter of such materials.43 In fact, this sector of the
economy was generating a trade surplus of more than one billion dollars.44
Nonetheless, around the same time, the U.S. International Trade Commission
estimated American companies were losing approximately fifty billion dollars
per year due to global piracy.45 Such losses were the result of advances in
technology that made it easier to copy and disseminate copyrighted works, but
also arguably caused by “inadequate legal protection for United States
intellectual property around the world.”46
Yet the United States did not have much leverage to request
improvements in the copyright laws of other nations as historically the United
States had been incredibly reluctant to amend its own provisions to simply
remove its remaining formalities. Accordingly, the “American negotiating
position [was] placed at a disadvantage with regard to improved copyright
protection in foreign countries” because the “United States neither belongs to
the Berne Union nor has a copyright law that would allow us to join.”47 As
the House Report detailed:

39. The requirement of copyright notice was previously one of the biggest
barriers to the United States membership in Berne. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 12
(1988). As the Senate Report aptly stated: “The requirement that a work bear some
sort of a notice of copyright in order to obtain or maintain copyright protection has
been a feature of every U.S. copyright law since the original Copyright Act of 1790.”
Id. Additionally, the Committee agreed with the Register of Copyright regarding the
need to eliminate this provision, noting “the same conclusion has been reached by
virtually every witness and commentator who has addressed the [Section 401 et seq.]
notice provisions of current U.S. copyright law.” Id. At 13.
40. Id. at 14–15
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. In 1987, the surplus was more than 1.5 million dollars. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 18 (1988).
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In bilateral negotiations, foreign countries often point to the perceived
deficiencies in U.S. protection, creating an excuse to avoid making
improvements to their own laws. By way of illustration, in bilateral
negotiations with Singapore and Korea, the American negotiators were
repeatedly asked the difficult question of why the United States was
pushing so hard for strong copyright protection in these countries
while we did not adhere to the Berne Convention.48

Adding to the impetus for change at the time, the United States had
successfully lobbied to include intellectual property as one of the topics of
negotiation in connection with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”), a multilateral trade agreement focused on removing barriers to
international trade.49 Differences in the protection of intellectual property
were increasingly seen as creating barriers to trade, and there was a growing
recognition of the need for harmonization in this area of the law.50 As one
commentator aptly stated: “No major trading nation in today’s world can
enjoy the indulgence of having intellectual property laws significantly
different from those of the world community. In one sense, unusual
intellectual property laws are a tariff and an unnatural barrier to world
trade.”51
Consequently, between 1985 and 1988, both the Senate and House of
Representatives conducted numerous hearings on the possibility of U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention.52 Ultimately, this resulted in two very
different bills originating from each chamber in 1988. While the House
version of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 utilized a
“minimalist approach,” the Senate included more comprehensive
amendments to the current copyright law.53
The U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary’s report accompanying its
bill, H.R. 4262, provided that the objectives of the legislation were to amend
the Copyright Act only where there is a clear conflict with the express
provisions of the Berne Convention (Paris Act of 1971); and further,
to amend only insofar as it is necessary to resolve the conflict in a
manner compatible with the public interest, respecting the pre-existing
balance of rights and limitations in the Copyright Act as a whole.54

48. Id.
49. Id. at 19. Specifically, it was placed on the agenda of the Uruguay Round
Negotiations. Id.
50. J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property – America’s Overlooked Export,
20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 811–13 (1995).
51. Id. at 816.
52. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 5-6 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7–10
(1988).
53. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7; S. REP. NO.100-352.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20.
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As such, the changes originally proposed by the House bill were quite
limited55 and did not include any amendments to the registration prerequisite
of Section 411(a). Although the House Report acknowledged that there were
“divergent views” on whether the “requirement that claimants seek
registration before copyright infringement suits,” was compatible with Berne,
the [House Judiciary] Committee ultimately decided the precondition was
merely “procedural in nature and does not in any sense lead to a ‘loss of
copyright.’”56 Additionally, the Committee questionably claimed this
determination was strengthened by the fact that other Berne Convention
countries “maintain registration systems” and “have procedural requirements
for bringing copyright infringement actions: papers must be served and filed,
documents must be produced, court costs and litigation costs must be paid.”57
While it is difficult to liken registration as a prerequisite to the filing of a
lawsuit with an obligation to provide service of process or the mere presence
of an optional copyright registry, the House Judiciary Committee initially took
this position in its report.58 Even so, the Committee “considered the
contention that other countries might retaliate against the United States” if
changes were not made to Section 411(a) after joining Berne but in the end,
decided “these concerns are probably not well-founded and are certainly
speculative.”59 Nonetheless, the House eventually relented on this issue,
agreeing to change this portion of the proposed legislation to avoid a conflict
with the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities.60
The report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary analyzed the
issues associated with Section 411(a) much differently, and accordingly, it
recommended significant amendments to the language of the provision.61
From the perspective of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “[t]he failure to
register a claim of copyright in a work has profound consequences for the
ability of an author or other copyright claimant to enforce his or her claim to

55. Id. at 25–27, 38, 50. These changes included: amending the compulsory
jukebox licensing system (“Section 8 of the bill proposes changes to the current
jukebox compulsory license by creating a new licensing system based on negotiations
with the compulsory license used as a fall-back should negotiations fail.”), removing
the requirement of notice (“The amendments to sections 401 and 402 make use of the
copyright notice voluntary – a work will no longer fall into the public domain at any
time because it is published without notice.”), and rejecting the call to expand
protection for architectural works (The Subcommittee “decided to scale back the
extent of the amendments” and left current law providing for protection on
architectural plans but not the building itself intact) or moral rights (“[T]he Committee
finds that current United States law meets the requirements of the Berne
Convention.”). Id.
56. Id. at 41.
57. Id. at 42–43. See Section IV infra for further evaluation of this determination.
58. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 41.
59. Id. at 43.
60. Infra note 204.
61. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 64–65.
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copyright.”62 While the Senate report recognized the author of an unregistered
work technically has a copyright in the work, practically speaking the
“‘enjoyment and exercise’ of that copyright is severely limited, or perhaps
non-existent, if [the author] is barred access to the only forum in which [he or
she] may seek to prevent, or to be compensated for, unauthorized
reproductions or other infringements of the work.”63 The result was the author
of an unregistered work has at most “a right without a remedy.”64 The report
also highlighted the fact that no other “major player in the Berne system . . .
requires registration as a condition of judicial enforcement of copyright.”65
Additionally, no such requirement is “found in the copyright systems of those
Berne members, such as the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth
countries, whose legal systems, like ours, derive from the common law.”66
Unlike the House Committee, the Senate was concerned about the
negative impact this could have on international copyright protection if no
changes were made to Section 411(a).67 As the report elucidated, “[i]f the
world’s largest exporter of copyrighted goods takes the position that a
government agency may, without violating Berne standards, be entrusted with
the keys to the courthouse door in infringement actions, other countries may
seize upon this precedent to impose truly onerous and unjustified prerequisites
to copyright enforcement in their legal systems.”68 The Senate Committee
also disagreed with the House Committee’s position that the prospect of
retaliation was purely speculative, instead viewing it as a genuine risk of
retaining Section 411(a) in its current form.69 Additionally, the report
cautioned:
This . . . would undermine the advantages for enhanced trade in
copyrighted works that would otherwise flow from adherence to
Berne. The burden lifted from the shoulders of our trade negotiators
by U.S. adherence to Berne would be replaced by another difficult
addition to the agenda of our bilateral discussions on copyright
policy.70

Not surprisingly, the Senate’s version of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 would have replaced Section 411(a) with the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 18–20.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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following language: “Registration is not a prerequisite to the institution of a
civil action for infringement of a copyright.”71
Ultimately, the House and Senate compromised by seizing upon an
exception to the treaty’s prohibition on formalities.72 While the Berne
Convention forbids member states from imposing preconditions that impinge
on the ability to “enjoy and exercise” copyright rights, this bar only applies to
foreign works.73 Therefore, the United States would technically be free to
require compliance with additional obligations for domestic works.74 The end
result was an amendment to Section 411(a) that read as follows: “[N]o civil
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title.”75 Accordingly, this created an unfortunate double
standard concerning access to the courts dependent upon where the work was
first published.76 While owners of foreign works could now immediately file
a copyright infringement suit in the United States, owners of domestic works
could not because the exemption to the registration requirement was not
universally applicable. The arguable unfairness of the situation did not go
unnoticed.77

C. Copyright Reform Act of 1993
In 1993, bills were introduced concurrently in both chambers of
Congress to repeal Section 411(a) and thereby rectify the imbalance between
the handling of domestic and foreign works under the statute.78 As the sponsor
of the Senate bill stated, “Congress created a two-tier system that continued
to impose [the registration] requirement on American authors, but exempted
foreign authors. So we in effect, decided to discriminate against American
authors, and we continue to do so.”79 Additionally, the sponsor of the House
bill remarked that “While the two-tier approach permitted adherence to the
Berne Convention, it has resulted in U.S. authors being less favorably treated

71. Id. at 36. As reflected in the House Report, there was an “overwhelming
consensus” that the then current balance of rights in the Copyright Act reflected
“deeply felt legal, economic and social values . . . ” notwithstanding the benefits of
international harmony. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 20 (1988).
72. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 16; H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 40.
73. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 18–19.
74. Id.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 373, 103d Cong. (1993).
79. Copyright Reform Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 373 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyright and Trademarks of the Senate, 103d Cong. 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter
Hearing on Copyright Reform Act] (statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini).
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than foreign authors. With Berne adherence behind us, it is time to rethink
the two-tier approach.”80
In connection with Congressional hearings on the bills, numerous
creators testified to the challenges and negative impacts associated with the
Authors and
registration precondition in place for U.S. works.81
photographers explained the practical impossibility of registering all of one’s
artistic outputs due to the sheer volume of works produced and attendant
costs.82 As one author stated, “[t]o register every copyright is an impossibility
for the fertile and prolific creator. [Many] cannot afford the burden of
registering every one of their poems, essays, stories, photographs, sketches.”83
This was especially problematic for professional photographers, who often
produce thousands of photos each month,84 and large photographic studio
chains, which can generate almost half a million during the same time
period.85 Somewhat relatedly, many individuals also testified to the fact that
creative types frequently do not have the time to devote to completing
copyright registration forms or are simply unaware of the necessity of
copyright registration and its importance to protecting their works.86
Additionally, in some creative industries, infringement may even occur
prior to the authorized commercial release of the work. This is due to the fact
that “works intended for publication usually are not registered until they are
in final form and are being disseminated to the public.”87 For example, some
companies are often not able to immediately register the works due to testing
80. 139 CONG. REC. E33701 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Hughes).
81. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 48 (testimony of Erica Jong).
84. Id. at 161 (submission of Jim Marie of Purple Mesa Productions) (“Like
many professional photographers, I produce thousands of individual images each year,
to be more specific I produced 1,436 images in the last 30 days! Time constraints,
limited staff (I am the chief cook and bottle washer in my business) and complicated
forms make registration of each photograph a virtual impossibility.”).
85. Id. at 180–81 (statement of Olan Mills, II, Chairman of the Board, Olan Mills,
Inc.: “Our lawyers tell us that the prior registration requirements have greatly
complicated that enforcement effort. So, you might ask, why don’t we register?
Simply stated, advance registration would be an enormous burden. We do not know
what photographs will be infringed, so we would need to register each and every
photograph. As I said before, we have 900 studios. In total, our company produces
well over 100,000 photographs per week.”).
86. Id. at 48 (testimony of Erica Jong) (“Most do not even know about the
requirements of registration as a precondition for meaningful enforcement”); Id. at
132 (testimony of Enid Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.) (“[T]his
is something that’s magnified greatly in the smaller companies who don’t have the
resources or the knowledge of the copyright registration requirements to protect
themselves.”).
87. Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,
286 (2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. Part § 202); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at
4 (2005).
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and adjustments that must occur prior to the release of a new product. As the
corporate counsel of one such entity explained:
[In] the software industry, the pressures of getting your product to
market are such that we don’t always get our registration on file by the
time we roll out the product. We are still making changes to the
product at the last possible moment before reproduction for sale . . . .
Another software company, very prominent in the industry, had to file
suit recently to combat piracy of one of their beta releases. And so it
is not unusual for even the largest software companies to not have
registered their products at the time it is rolled out.88

Consequently, the delay between discovering an infringement and
procuring the obligatory registration can result in the loss of thousands of
dollars in potential sales.89
Ultimately, despite the many persuasive arguments concerning the
harms associated with the registration prerequisite, the legislation was never
enacted. While the House version of the bill passed twice, the Senate’s
companion bill never made it to the floor.90 However, more than a decade
later, the problems of pre-release infringement and its connection to Section
411(a) would once again be examined by Congress.

D. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005
In 2005, copyright owners from the entertainment industry succeeded in
convincing Congress that the current law needed to be amended as “the
existing rules making copyright registration a prerequisite for suit for
infringement of United States works . . . [were] unduly burdensome on
plaintiffs seeking relief against pre-release infringement in civil suits for
copyright.”91 Instead of completely removing the requirement of registration
under Section 411(a), the legislative history makes clear the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 (“FECA”) was a response to a
specific type of pre-registration infringement, namely the “illicit camcording”
of motion pictures.92 The Senate Report accompanying the legislation
described the typical acts associated with such illegal recordings as follows:

88. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 132 (testimony of Enid
Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.).
89. Id. (“We lost thousands of dollars in potential sales to software pirates just in
the interim between the time we found the infringement and the time we got expedited
registration.”) (emphasis added). See infra Section IV.C.1 (discussing the monetary
costs associated with the expedited registration process and how it is not a solution to
the delays attendant in the current system).
90. 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:80 (rev. ed. 2018).
91. Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, supra note 87.
92. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, at 2 (2005).
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[A]n offender attends a pre-opening “screening” or a first-weekend
theatrical release, and uses sophisticated digital equipment to record
the movie. A camcorded version is then sold to a local production
factory or to an overseas producer where it is converted into DVDs or
similar products and sold on the street for a few dollars per copy . . . .
Causing greater financial harm, these camcorded versions are posted
on the Internet through certain peer-to-peer networks and made
available for millions of users to download.93

Such infringements purportedly resulted in a significant loss for the
Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), as studies found these
“camcorded versions of movies in theatrical release account[ed] for more than
90 percent of the first copies of motion pictures illegally distributed on the
Internet.”94 In order to remedy the situation, FECA directed the Register of
Copyright to issue regulations in order to create a process by which works
could be “preregistered.”95 However, such preregistration would merely serve
“as a place-holder for limited purposes, mainly when a copyright owner needs
to sue for infringement while a work is still being prepared for commercial
release.”96 The statute also expressly restricted preregistration to those
categories of copyrightable works that had historically been infringed prior to
their authorized commercial distribution.97
Ultimately, the Register of Copyrights determined the following classes
of works were eligible for preregistration98: (1) motion pictures; (2) sound
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) (2018).
96. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Preregistration Information, http://www.copyrigh
t.gov/prereg/help.html [perma.cc/4UG3-77UZ] (last accessed April 12, 2020).
97. Id.
98. It is also worth mentioning the other category of copyrighted works that had
previously been granted special treatment with regard to the necessity of registration
prior to an infringement suit. At the time the Copyright Act of 1976 was originally
passed, Congress carved out a small exception to the registration prerequisite for
broadcasts that were being transmitted live. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 46. Very little is
said about this provision in the legislative history aside from the fact that it “is intended
to deal with the special situation presented by works that are being transmitted ‘live’
at the same time they are being fixed in tangible form for the first time.” H.R. REP.
NO. 105-25, at 157 (1997); see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 7.16 (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2018) [hereinafter
NIMMER & NIMMER] (describing the exception as “[t]his strange provision”). Such
works did not require prior registration in order to bring an infringement action, but
instead a suit could be brought even before the work’s first fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)
(2018); see also NIMMER & NIMMER § 7.16. However, the statute expressly provided
that in order to be eligible to utilize this exception, owners of such works were also
required to serve notice upon the infringer not less than ten days before such fixation,
identify the work along with the specific time and source of its first transmission, and
declare an intention to secure copyright in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2018).
Additionally, the copyright owner was required to register the work within three
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recordings; (3) musical compositions; (4) literary works being prepared for
publication in book form; (5) computer programs (including videogames); and
(6) advertising or marketing photographs.99 Additionally, the regulations
stipulate a copyrighted work must also be unpublished and be in the process
of becoming prepared for commercial distribution.100 Moreover, as the
Copyright Office has made clear, “[p]registration is not a substitute for
registration,”101 and therefore, the work must ultimately be registered the
earlier of three months after the first publication of the work or one month
after the copyright owner has learned of the infringement.102 If the owner of
a preregistered work fails to register the work during the required time frame,
a court must dismiss an action for copyright infringement that occurred before
or within the first two months after first publication.103
While FECA provided some relief from the registration prerequisite
under Section 411(a), it was quite limited. As only certain categories of works
in very specific contexts were able to utilize the new preregistration process,
the vast majority of copyrighted works created in the United States were still
subject to the traditional rule mandating registration prior to bringing an
infringement suit.104 However, courts were increasingly attempting to
mitigate the harshness of this statutory requirement through a combination of
various statutory interpretations and public policy arguments. Ultimately, the
U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on these practices and resolved the split
among U.S. Courts of Appeals.

III. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Prior to 2010, courts often classified the registration requirement under
Section 411(a) as jurisdictional in nature.105 In fact, approximately 200
months after its first transmission. Id. In 1997, a technical amendment was made to
this provision, changing the time frame for the service of notice upon the potential
infringer from 10 days to “not less than 48 hours.” H.R. 672, 105th Cong. (1997).
According to the legislative history, this modification was necessary because the
“provision has proven problematic when applied to a number of sporting events,
especially elimination play-offs. In many instances the teams and the times of the
games are not known 10 days in advance. Therefore, this notice provision is amended
to provide for notice of not less than 48 hours.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-25, at 16 (1997);
NIMMER & NIMMER, § 7.16. Eventually, this provision was recodified as 17 U.S.C. §
411(c) due to a later amendment. See NIMMER & NIMMER § 7.16.
99. Preregistration of Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 202.16 (2018).
100. Id.
101. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 96.
102. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, U.S.C. § 408(f) (2019).
103. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 96.
104. Preregistration of Copyrights, 37 U.S.C. § 202.16 (2018).
105. See, e.g., Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Resources, Inc., 542 F.3d
859, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Normally, of course, the district court would certainly
have subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright infringement claim. However, the
Copyright Act makes clear that ‘no action for infringement of the copyright in any
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decisions had regarded it as such.106 However, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, the U.S. Supreme Court held Section 411(a) did not restrict a
federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.107 While recognizing the provision
had historically been treated as “jurisdictional” and was therefore a factor in
the analysis, the Court held this characterization was not dispositive.108
Instead, the Court determined the provision was merely imposing “a type of
precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment under our
precedents.”109 The Court supported its position by explaining that Section
411(a) is not clearly labeled as jurisdictional, is not located in a jurisdictiongranting provision, and contains numerous congressionally authorized
exceptions such as its inapplicability to non-U.S. works.110 The concurrence
further emphasized that earlier decisions characterizing registration as
jurisdictional should be accorded “no precedential effect” as none of them
were “from this Court, and most are ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings.’”111
Reed’s definitive characterization of Section 411(a)’s registration
prerequisite as nonjurisdictional, along with the concurrence questioning the
value of prior caselaw related to this provision, brought the developing split
among the federal courts into sharper focus. Both before and after Reed, there
were two conflicting interpretations of Section 411(a)’s registration
requirement in the circuit courts.112 Some courts began to interpret the
requirement of registration under Section 411(a) as fulfilled once a complete

United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.’ 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (noting also that an
infringement action may be brought if application for a copyright has been made and
denied). ‘The consensus among federal appellate courts is that the provisions of 17
U.S.C. § 411(a) are jurisdictional.’”).
106. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 173–74 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment
Below at 38, Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 154 (No. 08-103)).
107. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 157.
108. Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 166.
110. Id. at 165. See supra Section II.B for a discussion regarding Congress’
removal of non-US works from the registration precondition under Section 411(a) as
part of the changes necessary for the United States to become a member of the Berne
Convention. Additionally, the Court made passing reference to the special treatment
of live broadcasts under Section 411(c). See also supra note 98 (explaining this
limited exception).
111. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 173–174 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16(B)(2)(c).
112. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir.
2010) (attributing the names for these two approaches to the Tenth Circuit in La
Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005))
abrogated by Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct.
881 (2019).
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application113 for registration was filed with the Copyright Office – this
became known as the “application approach.”114 Such a reading of the statute
was further bolstered by the removal of jurisdiction from the analysis postReed. Other courts maintained the prerequisite was only satisfied once the
Copyright Office acted upon an application and either approved or rejected

113. In order to constitute a complete application, the application itself, the filing
fee, and any necessary deposit materials would need to be submitted. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 408 (“Copyright registration in general”).
114. See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–21 (holding the application
approach is the proper interpretation); Penpower Tech., Ltd. v. S.P.C. Tech., 627 F.
Supp. 2d 1083, 1091 (N.D. Ca. 2008) (“The Court is convinced that the plain language
of § 411 permits a plaintiff to initiate a copyright infringement claim before the actual
issuance of a registration certificate.”); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010,
1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A copyright in a work ‘subsists from its creation.’ However,
the copyright owner may not sue for infringement under the federal Copyright Act
until the owner has delivered the deposit, application, and fee required for registration
to the United States Copyright Office.”) (citations omitted); Positive Black Talk, Inc.
v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Although some
circuits require that a plaintiff actually obtain a certificate from the Copyright Office
before bringing suit, the Fifth Circuit requires only that the Copyright Office actually
receive the application, deposit, and fee before a plaintiff files an infringement
action”); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright Office to be
valid, an application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued
upon”); Geoscan, Inc. of Tex. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir.
2000) (“[A] plaintiff has complied with all statutory formalities for copyright
registration when the Copyright office receives the plaintiff’s application for
registration, fee, and deposit.”); Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–
87 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding only the “payment of the required fee, deposit of the work
in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application” is
necessary to bring suit); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“A plaintiff has complied with the statutory formalities when the Copyright Office
receives the plaintiff’s application for registration, fee and deposit”); Caner v. Autry,
16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 708 (W.D. Va. 2014) (“[T]he Application Approach represents a
better reading of the provisions of the Copyright Act at issue, and . . . it better
effectuates the policies Congress meant to promote through that Act.”); Phx.
Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“[A]
complaint alleging that the copyright holder properly applied for registration with the
Copyright Office is sufficient to satisfy the precondition to an infringement action.”);
Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d
70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Having considered Power Washers’ motion, Kitchen
Exhaust’s opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that
Kitchen Exhaust’s attempts at registration before filing suit were adequate under the
Copyright Act . . . .”); see also, Gable-Leigh v. N. Am. Miss, No. 01-1019, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25614, 2001 WL 521695, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 13, 2001).
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it.115 This was referred to as the so-called “registration approach.”116
Ultimately, in March 2019, the Supreme Court revisited Section 411(a) in
order to resolve this split in Fourth Estate.117 In the meantime, as one court
rightly stated, “[c]opious judicial ink has been spilled over the proper
prerequisites for bringing a copyright suit in federal court.”118

A. The “Application Approach”
Courts adopting the application approach, as well as the leading treatise
on Copyright Law,119 claimed that it better comported with the language of
various statutory provisions in the Copyright Act, effectively addressed a
number of policy concerns, and reflected Congress’ overall purpose in passing
the 1976 Act, namely providing broad copyright protection.120 Examining the
statutory language of Section 411(a) first, courts often viewed the following
language as supporting their position:
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required
for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper
form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to
institute an action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.121

Since the Copyright Act allows a copyright owner to file an infringement
action regardless of whether the Register of Copyrights ultimately determines
the work is entitled to registration or alternatively is rejected, adherents to this

115. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the change to copyright law that made it
clear copyright owners could proceed with a copyright infringement lawsuit even if
the Register of Copyrights determined the work in question was not copyrightable
after evaluating an application for registration).
116. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338,
1340 (11th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1208
(“A suit for copyright infringement cannot be brought unless and until the copyright
is registered.”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-26, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (“Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), absent certain circumstances not applicable here,
one cannot bring a copyright infringement action until the copyright is registered.”);
Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (“[T]he plain language of the Copyright Act unambiguously mandates the
actual issuance of a registration certificate before a copyright action is brought . . . .”).
117. 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019).
118. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 705.
119. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(ii).
120. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d. at 708; Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp,
606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v.
Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
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approach argued it was logical to conclude the application to register is
sufficient to fulfill the precondition to filing an infringement action.122
Many of the courts adhering to this interpretation of the Copyright Act
also pointed to Section 410(d) to reinforce their conclusion. Section 410(d)
states: “The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an
application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of
Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for
registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office.”123 As this
subsection provides for a later approved registration to be back-dated to the
original date of application,124 courts held this lent additional strength to the
argument that “registration” occurs on the day the application is actually
received by the Copyright Office.125
Likewise, Section 408(a) can also be read to provide further credence to
the argument that “registration” requires only submission of a completed
application. This provision of the Copyright Act states: “[T]he owner of a
copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the
copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by
this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409
and 708.”126 Impliedly, the “sole requirement for obtaining registration is
delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”127 Additionally, courts relied
on the last portion of Section 408(a), which stipulates “registration is not a
condition of copyright protection” to further strengthen their argument.128
Aside from the statutory language, proponents of the application
approach argued it “most efficaciously facilitates the judicial protection of
copyrights through infringement actions.”129 Courts were concerned about

122. Prunte v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 40 (D.D.C. 2007)
(citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, at § 7.16(B)(1)(a)(i)); see also Cosmetic
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2018).
124. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40. The
Ninth Circuit in Cosmetic Ideas acknowledged a possible limitation to this argument
“because this back-dating does not occur until after the Copyright Office or a court
has deemed the registration acceptable, the statute could be read to require action by
the Register to effect registration.” Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
125. Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.R.I. 2003); see also Cosmetic
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d. at 40.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018).
127. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617; see also Pruente, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 40;
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. America Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C.
2004).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018); La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel
Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the arguments of those
courts adopting the “application approach,” but ultimately deciding to utilize the
“registration approach”), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010).
129. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98 at
§ 7.16(B)(1)(a)).
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the delays that would occur if litigants were required to wait for the Copyright
Office to review an application for registration, especially since the legal
action would be able to proceed regardless of the determination made by the
Register on the issue of copyrightability.130 Moreover, the Register’s eventual
decision is subject to review by the courts.131 However, in the meantime, an
alleged infringer “may continue to dilute the copyright”132 during the time it
takes “for a government official [to be] able to sift through and approve what
is surely a large stack of copyright registration applications.”133
A strong argument could be made that the application approach best
promoted judicial economy. This was because in any case in which the
copyright owner had applied to register a work but had not yet received a
response from the Copyright Office, courts adhering to the registration
approach had to dismiss the case. More often than not, the copyright owner
would refile the infringement action in a matter of weeks or months.134 Not
surprisingly, even proponents of the registration approach acknowledged this
practice “leads to an inefficient and peculiar result.”135
Furthermore, there was also a risk the owner of a copyrighted work
might completely lose the ability to sue for infringement. Section 507(b) of
the Copyright Act prohibits any civil action “commenced within three years
after the claim accrued.”136 Consequently, in a registration approach
jurisdiction, a copyright owner who filed for an application for registration of
the work near the end of the statute of limitations period “could see the statute
of limitations expire during the time it took the Copyright Office to act on the
application.”137 Nonetheless, courts following the registration approach were
rarely sympathetic to such concerns. Instead, courts held the potential for this
type of loss would serve to encourage owners to register more quickly.138
Moreover, many courts also viewed resort to policy-based arguments or

130. See e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–620; Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp.
3d 689, 708 (W.D. Va. 2014); Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634; Phoenix
Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514–515 (E.D. Va. 2005).
131. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621.
132. Caner, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 708.
133. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
134. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620.
135. Id. (internal citations omitted); Loree Rodkin Mgmt Corp. v. Ross-Simons,
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (C.D. Cal 2004); Strategy Source, Inc., v. Lee,
233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2018).
137. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620.
138. See e.g., Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d
1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2017) (“True, an owner who files an application late in the
statute of limitations period risks losing the right to enforce his copyright in an
infringement action because of the time needed to review an application. But this
potential loss encourages an owner to register his copyright soon after he obtains the
copyright and before infringement occurs.”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 19

380

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

legislative history as simply unnecessary in light of what they regarded as
clear statutory language supporting the registration approach.139

B. The “Registration Approach”
Courts adhering to the registration approach often characterized the
answer to the question of when a copyrighted work is “registered” under
Section 411(a) as straightforward. The Eleventh Circuit’s statements in
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC reflect
such certitude: “[T]he text of the Copyright Act makes clear that the
registration approach that we [previously] endorsed . . . is correct. Filing an
application does not amount to registration.”140
Courts professedly found support for the registration approach in Section
410 which details the registration process itself. Subsection (a) states:
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that,
in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material deposited
constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and
formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall
register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration
under the seal of the Copyright Office.141

Courts argued this language plainly stipulates registration can only occur
after the Copyright Office has actually reviewed the application and that

139. Id. (“Fourth Estate devotes its remaining statutory arguments to legislative
history and policy, but ‘[w]hen,’ as here, ‘the words of a statute are unambiguous, then
. . . judicial inquiry is complete.’ Indeed, ‘[e]ven if a statute’s legislative history
evinces an intent contrary to its straightforward statutory command, we do not resort
to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.’”) (citations omitted); see
also La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“The Application approach, at first glance, has some appeal . . . . Courts
adopting the Application approach plausibly claim that their approach provides a sort
of rough justice because it allows copyright owners to file suit while still maintaining
the requirement that an owner obtain a certificate before a court can invoke the
remedies contained in Title 17. Whatever the practical force of this argument, we
cannot ignore the plain meaning of the statute, nor change the legislative scheme.”)
(citations omitted), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“We
certainly understand the strong, largely meritorious, policy considerations that weigh
in favor of permitting a copyright infringement plaintiff to sue during the pendency of
his copyright application. In the end, perhaps the application approach makes more
practical sense, perhaps not. Either way, our own policy views do not give us license
to rewrite an unambiguous statute. In enacting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), Congress chose the
registration approach, and we must abide by that decision.”) (citations omitted).
140. 856 F.3d at 1341.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2018).
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merely filing an application is insufficient to constitute registration.142
Otherwise, the examination requirement would arguably “be meaningless if
filing and registration were synonymous.”143
Relatedly, courts also pointed to Subsection (b) of Section 410 as support
for the registration approach. This provision of the Copyright Act provides
as follows: “In any case in which the Register of Copyright determines that
. . . the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or
the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Register shall refuse
registration.”144 These courts contended that the Copyright Office would not
have the ability to reject an application purportedly submitted for registration
if it occurred immediately upon filing.145
Additionally, courts maintained that Section 410(d) further substantiated
their position on when registration occurs under the Copyright Act. As
discussed above,146 this subsection provides that the effective date of a
copyright registration is retroactive to the date on which the copyright owner
originally filed the application.147 However, advocates of the registration
approach highlight the portion of the statutory language that allows for such
backdating only after the Register of Copyright has deemed the submission
“acceptable.”148 According to supporters of the registration approach, this
further confirms the necessity of review and approval by the Register of
Copyrights before registration can be said to have taken place, thereby
rendering the mere act of filing an application legally insufficient.149
Aside from the language of the Copyright Act itself, courts also held that
their interpretation of the registration prerequisite under Section 411(a) was
supported by Congressional changes to the statute, in particular, the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988 and FECA.150 As detailed above,151
both pieces of legislation made changes to Section 411(a), namely removing
the necessity of registration prior to filing an infringement action for foreign
works and creating a new preregistration procedure for a limited class of
domestic works. Congress’ choice to eliminate this precondition for some
works, but not all, arguably confirms registration must generally be made

142. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
143. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202 (citing Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc.,
1996 WL 663880, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. RossSimons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) (2018).
145. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341.
146. Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, proponents of the application
approach also view this provision of the Copyright Act as supporting their preferred
definition of registration. See supra Section III.A.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2018).
148. Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341–42.
149. Id. at 1342.
150. See e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,
1205–07 (10th Cir. 2005).
151. See supra Sections II.B & II.D.
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absent an explicit statutory exemption. Eventually, however, the Supreme
Court would have to decide which approach was the correct one.

C. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Approach
In Fourth Estate, the petitioner, Fourth Estate Public Benefit
Corporation (“Fourth Estate”), sued the respondent Wall-Street, LLC (“WallStreet”) for copyright infringement.152 The two parties had previously entered
into a licensing agreement in which Fourth Estate had allowed Wall-Street to
display its news content on Wall-Street’s website.153 However, the license
agreement required Wall-Street to completely remove from its website all
Fourth Estate content prior to canceling the agreement.154 Nonetheless, when
Wall-Street terminated the contract, it continued to display content on its
website produced by Fourth Estate in violation of the license.155
Subsequently, Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its owner.156
The complaint alleged that while Fourth Estate had filed applications for
registration with the Register of Copyrights, the Copyright Office had not yet
rendered any decisions concerning their copyrightability.157 Consequently,
Wall-Street and its owner filed a motion to dismiss arguing the Copyright Act
requires more than merely filing an application, but instead, requires either a
registration or a denial of a registration prior to filing suit.158 The District
Court agreed and dismissed the suit, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.159 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of when Section
411(a)’s copyright registration requirement was met.160 Specifically, “Has
registration . . . been made in accordance with [Title 17] as soon as the
claimant delivers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the
Copyright Office; or has registration . . . been made only after the Copyright
Office reviews and registers the copyright?”161
The Court began by observing that under the Copyright Act protection
attaches as soon as a work is created.162 As such, the author immediately

152. 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. According to the Court, “[c]onsideration of Fourth Estate’s filings was
initially delayed because the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the filing fee was
rejected by Fourth Estate’s bank as uncollectible. Id. at 887 n.2.
158. Id.; see also Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856
F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017).
159. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887. Ultimately, the Copyright Office denied
Fourth Estate’s applications for registration. Id.
However, the issue of
copyrightability was not before the Court. Id. at 887 n.3.
160. Id. at 886–87.
161. Id. at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 887; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
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acquires a number of exclusive rights, including the right of reproduction,
distribution, and public display.163 Furthermore, the Court recognized the
“Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to institute a civil action for
infringement of those exclusive rights.”164 Nonetheless, as the Court correctly
pointed out, “[b]efore pursuing an infringement claim in court, . . . a copyright
claimant generally must comply with Section 411(a)’s requirement that
‘registration of the copyright claim has been made.’”165
The Court next took a detailed look at the statutory language of Section
411(a) – beginning with the first two sentences of the provision – which states
as follows:
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any
case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for
registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form
and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a
civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the
complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.166

The Court held this language focuses on the action of the Copyright
Office in approving or denying registration as opposed to the copyright
owner’s act of applying.167 Therefore, if merely filing an application for
registration was sufficient, “allowing suit upon refusal of registration – would
be superfluous.”168 The Court then analyzed the final sentence of Section
411(a) which allows the Register to “become a party to the action with respect
to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.”169 The Court similarly
held this portion of the statutory provision requires the Register to render a
decision on the copyrightability of a given application before a suit can be
filed.170 Per the Court, a different interpretation would negate the ability of
the Register to join the litigation and deprive a court “the benefit of the
Register’s assessment.”171
The Court also examined a number of other provisions that it viewed as
supportive of its reading of registration in Section 411(a) and thus

163. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018)).
164. Id. at 887 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2018)).
165. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)). The Court took notice of the fact that
the potential statutory exceptions to the requirement of registration were not present
and that all the parties were in agreement on this issue. Id. at 888.
166. Id. at 888 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 889.
169. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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necessitating action by the Register.172 This included subsections (a), (b), and
(d) of Section 410, which the Court maintained “confirms that application is
discrete from, and precedes, registration.” In so doing, the Court affirmed the
analysis previously taken by lower courts following the “registration
approach.”173 Additionally, the Court evaluated Section 408(f), which allows
for the preregistration of certain types of works under specific
circumstances.174 According to the Court, “[a] copyright owner who fears
prepublication infringement would have no reason to apply for
preregistration, however, if she could instead simply complete an application
for registration and immediately commence an infringement suit.”175
Next, the Court addressed various arguments advanced by Fourth Estate.
Aside from a number of statutory interpretation claims with which the Court
disagreed,176 Fourth Estate raised the possibility that a copyright owner could
completely lose the ability to bring suit if the “registration approach” were
adopted. This might occur because the statute of limitations for copyright
infringement actions is three years and the current processing time for
applications submitted to the Copyright Office is seven months.177 While the
Court acknowledged that processing times have increased, the Court
nonetheless viewed Fourth Estate’s concerns as “overstated.”178 Furthermore,
the Court stated “[d]elays in Copyright Office processing of applications, it
appears, are attributable, in large measure, to staffing and budgetary shortages
that Congress can alleviate, but courts cannot cure. Unfortunate as the current
administrative lag may be, that factor does not allow us to revise § 411(a)’s
congressionally composed text.”179 The Court concluded by holding,
“‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has
registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”180
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also supra Section III.B. (examining the analysis of “registration
approach” courts).
174. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 889; see also supra Section II.D. (reviewing the
promulgation of the preregistration option as part of the Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of 2005).
175. Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 889–90 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.
19, 29 (2001)) (rejecting an interpretation that “would in practical effect render [a
provision] superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances”).
176. Id. at 890–92. Fourth Estate argued that the phrase “make registration” and
“registration has been made” refer to submissions by the copyright owner as opposed
to the Copyright Office’s response to such applications. Id. at 890. Additionally,
Fourth Estate maintained that as the Copyright Act states in Section 408(a) that
“registration is not a condition of copyright protection,” an application for registration,
not the registration itself, should be sufficient to allow the copyright owner into court.
Id. at 891.
177. Id. at 892.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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IV. DISPENSING WITH THE REGISTRATION PREREQUISITE FOR
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
The Court’s decision in Fourth Estate to adopt the “registration
approach” is the correct decision from a purely statutory interpretation
perspective, as it allows for a less contrived reading of the Copyright Act’s
provisions. Nonetheless, the Court did not seem to fully appreciate the
numerous barriers imposed on copyright owners trying to protect their works
by requiring a registration decision prior to filing an infringement action. As
a report co-authored by Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer found,
“the requirement can result in harm and injustice to copyright owners by
effectively preventing or unduly delaying injunctive relief, by requiring
expensive and unproductive paperwork where many copyrights are involved
in a suit, and by offering defendants an opportunity for dilatory tactics.”181
While courts could previously utilize the “application approach” to mitigate
the shortcomings inherent with a system that grants rights immediately upon
a work’s creation but does not expressly provide for prompt access to the
courts to enforce such rights, this is no longer a possibility. Consequently, it
is now more imperative than ever to amend the copyright law to eliminate the
Section 411(a) registration prerequisite. As detailed below, while there may
be some arguable benefit to incentivizing federal copyright registration and
relatedly for preserving Section 411(a) as a part of this approach, they are
negligible when contrasted with the many drawbacks associated with
maintaining this precondition. Moreover, as highlighted in the following
discussion, removal of the registration prerequisite will also likely provide
numerous independent benefits over the current system. This Section
concludes with a brief discussion of the recent trend in academic scholarship
advocating for a return of copyright formalities and why it appears to be
misguided, at least regarding the copyright prerequisite of Section 411(a).

A. Purported Need to Incentivize Copyright Registration
One of the leading arguments in opposition to eliminating Section 411(a)
is that it would have a substantial, negative impact on the number of federal
copyright registrations. Discussions concerning the need for incentivizing
registration were a significant part of the deliberations surrounding the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. This was due to the fact that one of the
biggest changes to copyright law wrought by the new legislation was the
removal of mandatory registration for the protection of copyrightable work.182
181. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 30 (Report of Co-Chairs
Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, Library of Congress Advisory Committee
on Copyright Registration and Deposit).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018) (“Copyright registration in general”). Subsection
408(a) provides as follows:
(a) Registration Permissive. At any time during the subsistence of the first term
of copyright in any published or unpublished work in which the copyright was
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Even though “registration was made optional, Congress still valued having a
robust federal register of existing copyrights.”183 Copyright registration
arguably “provides a useful public record”184 and supplies “the Library of
Congress with an efficient means of obtaining copies of copyrighted
works.”185 This is due to the fact that applicants are generally required to
include “two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition of the work”
as part of the application process.186 However, as more fully explored below,
there are numerous limitations to the claim that the maintenance of Section
411(a) is necessary or even appropriate to achieve these purported goals.

1. More Important Incentives Remain
The ability to bring a lawsuit in the event of copyright infringement is
not the only incentive to federally registering a work. In fact, the 1976
revision to the Copyright Act provides “two even more powerful incentives
. . . as [S]ection 410(c) gives a timely registration prima facie effect in
infringement litigation, and [S]ection 412 conditions the availability of the
powerful remedies of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees upon timely
registration.”187 Furthermore, the annual statistics concerning applications
relative to the number of infringement suits filed are “comparatively
minuscule” and appear to have “little positive effect on the general goals of
registration and deposit.”188 For example, in 2017 the Copyright Office
secured before January 1, 1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright
secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right
in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the
application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not
a condition of copyright protection.

Id.
183. Cosmetic Ideas Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Copyrights Act H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 158 (1976)).
184. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19 (1988).
185. Id.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018) (“Copyright registration in general”). Subsection (b)
provides as follows: “(b) Deposit for Copyright Registration. Except as provided by
subsection (c), the material deposited for registration shall include – (1) in the case of
an unpublished work, one complete copy or phonorecord; (2) in the case of a published
work, two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition; (3) in the case of a
work first published outside the United States, one complete copy or phonorecord as
so published; (4) in the case of a contribution to a collective work, one complete copy
or phonorecord of the best edition of the collective work.”
187. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19 (1988).
188. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School) (comparing the 1,831
copyright infringement suits filed in 1991 to the 634,797 works submitted for
registration the same year and concluding that Section 411(a) “can thus be said to have
spurred the registration of, at most, only 1,831 works – only slightly more than onequarter of one percent of all applications filed that year. Even this figure is overly
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received 539,662 applications for registration,189 while the number of new
lawsuits filed alleging copyright infringement during the same time frame was
3,472.190 Additionally, the statistics do not specify exactly when or why an
application for registration was filed. Even if we generously assume all the
applications associated with copyright infringement suits were filed solely in
anticipation of impending litigation and to comply with Section 411(a), this
only accounts for less than one percent of the submissions to the Copyright
Office. Although Section 411(a) allows copyright owners to access the courts,
two even more powerful incentives included in the 1976 revision of
the Copyright Act govern what the copyright proprietor may seek once
the courthouse door is opened: [S]ection 410(c) gives a timely
registration prima facie effect in infringement litigation, and [S]ection
412 conditions the availability of the powerful remedies of statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees upon timely registration.191

i. Prima Facie Validity
If a copyright owner files an application for registration of a work either
before or within five years following its first publication, the registration
certificate “[c]onstitutes prima facie validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate” per Section 410(c) of the Copyright Act.192 As such,
this causes a “shift of the burden of going forward on this issue to the
defendant.”193 Conversely, if a copyright owner fails to register a work in
accordance with the timeline stated in Section 410(c), the proprietor “will
remain at a substantial disadvantage in the ensuing litigation.” This is due to
the fact that the now purported copyright owner will need to first prove the
work is copyrightable.194 Additionally, the “proprietor will assume the burden
of proving authorship of the work, and, for a published work, establishing the

generous since a substantial number of these 1,831 works were probably registered
earlier, ante litem motem.”).
189. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FISCAL 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2017/ar2017.pdf [perma.cc/J7KG-U8CN].
190. Fewer Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Filed, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (“TRAC”) REP., https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/483/
[perma.cc/QS9U-TAA6] (last visited May 9, 2019) (The total of 3,472 for FY 2017 is
based on the first eleven months of FY 2017 in which 3,183 suits were actually filed
and an additional estimate for the twelfth month of 289 new lawsuits).
191. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 19–20 (1988). The Report also noted “Section 205
(c) and (e) also provide an incentive for transferees of copyright [20] ownership to
ensure that registration is made. Finally, of course, there are the intangible factors that
may lead authors to register their works with the Copyright Office in the belief that a
registration certificate constitutes a government agency’s stamp of approval on the
fruit of the author’s creative efforts.” Id.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2018).
193. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 n.5 (1988).
194. Id. at 20, 24.
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origin of the work in either the United States, or a country with which the
United States has either multilateral or bilateral copyright relations, or
demonstrating some other basis upon which the court’s enforcement powers
under U.S. law may be invoked.”195 Consequently, in the vast majority of
cases, plaintiffs will likely continue to register their works in order to avoid
an otherwise time consuming and unnecessary impediment to prevailing on
their claim of copyright infringement.196
ii. Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Not only does a registration certificate make it easier to prove the
necessary elements of a successful copyright infringement case, but once a
viable claim is established, a federal registration allows for the possibility of
important, additional remedies otherwise not available to the copyright owner.
Under Section 412, statutory damages are available so long as the work at
issue was registered either prior to the time of infringement or within three
months of first publication.197 If a copyright owner elects to recover statutory
damages in place of actual damages and profits, the amount is usually in the
range of $750 to $30,000 per work infringed.198 However, if the infringement
was willful, a court can award up to $150,000 per work infringed.199 Statutory
damages can be especially helpful in cases where actual damages are difficult
to determine or where a work “has seemingly little extrinsic value.”200
Another significant benefit of timely federal registration is the successful
litigant may be entitled to attorney’s fees. Section 505 of the Copyright Act
provides a court with “wide latitude to award attorney’s fees” to the prevailing
party “based on the totality of circumstances in a case.”201 As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in connection with a copyright
infringement case, the prospect of attorney’s fees can be especially valuable

195. Id. at 20.
196. Id. at 24.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018) (“Registration as prerequisite to certain remedies for
Infringement”); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, at § 7.16(C) (2019).
198. § 504(c)(1) (“Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits”).
199. § 504(c)(2). This section also allows a court to reduce the statutory damage
award under certain circumstances, including cases of “innocent infringement.” Id.
The statute provides as follows: “In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”
Id.
200. La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1199–
1200 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010).
201. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016); 17
U.S.C. § 505 (2018) (“Remedies for infringement: Costs and attorney’s fees”); see
also, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994).
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“[f]or copyright owners hesitant to engage in the long and expensive process
of litigation.”202
iii. Questionable Impact
Clearly, the repeal of Section 411(a) would not remove all the available
incentives associated with registration, let alone the most powerful ones.
Consequently, the argument that the elimination of Section 411(a) would
have a substantial effect on the number of copyrightable works registered is
speculative at best. Quite simply, “it is unlikely that many copyright claimants
would choose to forego registration, given the attendant increased difficulties
they would encounter in seeking to prove and to obtain redress for
infringements.”203

2. Acquisition of Materials for the Library of Congress
One of the other principal arguments against the repeal of Section 411(a)
is that doing so would adversely affect the Library of Congress’ acquisition
of deposits. Representative of such concerns is the following statement in a
House report associated with an earlier bill concerning accession to the Berne
Convention and the purported necessity of Section 411(a) to both U.S. and
non-U.S. works:204
Registration is an important source of acquisitions for the Library of
Congress . . . . In a time of fiscal restraint, the absence of this
acquisition source-which is virtually cost-free to the taxpayer-would
have to be replaced by either the expenditure of public monies or the
establishment of increased fees by the Library, or a combination of
both. Moreover, registration as a prerequisite to suit helps to ensure
the existence of a central, public record of copyright claims. This
publicly available depository of information is of benefit to both
copyright owners and users.205

While the objections raised may have some validity, they appear to be
highly overstated. As discussed above, even without Section 411(a), many
more powerful incentives to registration remain.206 Moreover, as explored in
more detail below, the Copyright Act contains two separate deposit

202. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1199–1200.
203. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 (1988).
204. As discussed above, Congress eventually reached a compromise in which
Section 411(a) was amended to exclude foreign works from its purview in order to
comply with Berne’s prohibition on formalities. See supra Section II.B (examining
the debate concerning accession to the Berne Convention).
205. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 42 (1988).
206. See supra Section IV.A.1 (discussing prima facie validity, statutory damages,
and attorney’s fees).
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provisions.207 While Section 408 is tied to the copyright registration process,
Section 407 contains a mandatory deposit obligation that is instead triggered
by the act of publication.208
The strength of the acquisition argument is limited by the fact that
Section 407 could be utilized if particular published works are so needed for
the Library’s collections.209 Some commentators have even proposed
expanding this statutory authority210 and enforcing the requirement more
regularly211 to minimize any possible impacts on the Library of Congress’
collections. Additionally, as further explored in the following subsections:
[T]he Library of Congress need not add all deposited works to its
collection, it apparently is not required to preserve those works which
it does add to its collection, and those which it does not so add,
although retained by the Copyright Office, need only be preserved “for
the longest period considered practicable and desirable by the Register
of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress.”212

Lastly, there is the more fundamental issue of whether the inequities
associated with placing the burden of “library building” on creators
attempting to register their copyrightable works is still appropriate.
i. Section 407: Mandatory Deposit and Major Exemptions
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act requires the owner of a copyrighted
work published in the United States to deposit in the U.S. Copyright Office
two complete copies of the best edition of the work within three months after
a work is published for the use of the Library of Congress.213 Furthermore,
the owner of a work first published in a foreign country but then distributed
in the United States must also comply with the mandatory deposit
requirement.214 Although the federal copyright registration process and its
207. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., U.S. COPYRIGHT CIRCULAR 7D: MANDATORY
DEPOSIT OF COPIES OR PHONORECORDS FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2019),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ07d.pdf [perma.cc/6LJ5-V4QD].
208. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (2018).
209. § 407.
210. See e.g., Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 5–6 (Statement
of Dr. James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress, accompanied by Mary
Levering, Acting Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth,
Co-chairs, Copyright Advisory Committee).
211. But see infra Part IV.A.2.iv (examining the concerns with placing the onus
of library building on a copyright owner).
212. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17[A] (citing 17 U.S.C. § 704(d)
(2018)).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2018).
214. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(10) (2019) (“Deposit of published copies or
phonorecords for the Library of Congress”); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
98, § 7.17(c)(2).
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attendant deposit requirement under Section 408 can concomitantly satisfy
Section 407(a), works for which an application has never been filed will still
need to independently meet this mandatory deposit obligation.215 This is due
to the fact that the purpose of deposit and registration are similar but not
identical.216 While deposit is designed to “provide the Library of Congress
via the Copyright Office with copies and phonorecords of all works published
within the United States,” registration is meant “to create a written record of
the copyright ownership in a work.”217
Failure to comply with the mandatory deposit requirement following a
written demand by the Register of Copyrights can result in an initial fine of
up to $250 per work and a required payment to the Library of Congress equal
to the retail cost of the material sought.218 An additional fine of $2500 can be
assessed in the event the owner of the work “willfully or repeatedly fails or
refuses to comply.”219 As such, the mandatory deposit provisions already
provide the Library of Congress with the means by which to acquire copies of
almost any copyrightable work so desired. Consequently, the elimination of
Section 411(a)’s registration prerequisite is unlikely to have any meaningful
effect on this facet of the Library of Congress’ acquisitions program.220
Moreover, many categories of works are no longer required to be
deposited. Section 407(c) allows the Register of Copyright to designate entire
classes of materials as exempt from such deposit obligations altogether.221
The list of excluded categories is extensive222 and is “intended to apply to that
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(F).
Id. at § 7.17(A).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (2018).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 22–23 (1988).
§ 407(d).
37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) states as follows:

The following categories of material are exempt from the deposit requirements
of section 407(a) of title 17:
(1) Diagrams and models illustrating scientific or technical works or
formulating scientific or technical information in linear or three-dimensional
form, such as an architectural or engineering blueprint, plan, or design, a
mechanical drawing, or an anatomical model.
(2) Greeting cards, picture postcards, and stationery.
(3) Lectures, sermons, speeches, and addresses when published individually
and not as a collection of the works of one or more authors.
(4) Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only as embodied in
phonorecords. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the
exclusive right of publication, in a sound recording resulting from the fixation
of such works in a phonorecord from the applicable deposit requirements for
the sound recording.
(5) Electronic works published in the United States and available only online.
This exemption includes electronic serials available only online only until such
time as a demand is issued by the Copyright Office under the regulations set
forth in § 202.24. This exemption does not apply to works that are published
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‘material the Library [of Congress] neither needs nor wants’ for its archival
purposes.”223 Additionally, at least historically, it appears that “a significant
amount of litigation involves works falling within one of these exempt
categories.”224 Collectively, this further diminishes the argument that Section
411(a) is necessary to ensure the Library of Congress’ acquisition activities
will not be adversely affected.225
ii. Section 408: Deposits of Questionable Utility
Section 408 of the Copyright Act ordinarily requires an applicant
seeking federal registration to submit a completed application form, the
requisite filing fee, and a deposit of two copies of the work.226 While large
in both online, electronic formats and in physical formats, which remain
subject to the appropriate mandatory deposit requirements.
(6) Three-dimensional sculptural works, and any works published only as
reproduced in or on jewelry, dolls, toys, games, plaques, floor coverings,
wallpaper and similar commercial wall coverings, textiles and other fabrics,
packaging material, or any useful article. Globes, relief models, and similar
cartographic representations of area are not within this category and are
subject to the applicable deposit requirements.
(7) Prints, labels, and other advertising matter, including catalogs, published
in connection with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale of articles of
merchandise, works of authorship, or services.
(8) Tests and answer material for tests when published separately from other
literary works.
(9) Works first published as individual contributions to collective works. This
category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of
publication, in the collective work as a whole, from the applicable deposit
requirements for the collective work.
(10) Works first published outside the United States and later published in the
United States without change in copyrightable content, if:
(i) Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the
work was published in the United States; or
(ii) Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the
work was published in the United States but before a demand for deposit
is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d).
(11) Works published only as embodied in a soundtrack that is an integral part
of a motion picture. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or
of the exclusive right of publication, in the motion picture, from the applicable
deposit requirements for the motion picture.
(12) Motion pictures that consist of television transmission programs and that
have been published, if at all, only by reason of a license or other grant to a
nonprofit institution of the right to make a fixation of such programs directly
from a transmission to the public, with or without the right to make further
uses of such fixations.

223. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(C)(3) (citing H.R. REP. 94-1476,
at 150 (1976)).
224. 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
225. Id.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018).
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categories of works are now excluded from mandatory deposit under Section
407,227 these deposit exemptions do not apply to works for which federal
copyright registration is sought under Section 408. While one might claim
this is a clear area in which removal of Section 411(a)’s registration
prerequisite may have a direct effect on the scope and breadth of the Library
of Congress’ collections, this is unlikely to be the case. First, “the
fundamental criteria governing regulations issued under section 407(c), which
allows exemptions from the deposit requirements for certain categories of
works, [are] the needs and wants of the Library.”228 Quite simply, those
excluded are not the type of works likely to be chosen for inclusion in any
Library of Congress collection.229
Furthermore, works that would otherwise be subject to mandatory
deposit but for fulfillment through the federal copyright application process
under Section 408 still may not be especially helpful or insightful. The
following Congressional testimony from an attorney for a large computer
software manufacturer is illustrative:
In our particular industry, we don’t believe that the current deposit
requirements are assisting the Library in maintaining its collections.
The deposit requirements require us only to submit approximately 75
pages of what’s called source code that for lack of a better word would
appear to you as gobbledy-gook. It’s a page of symbols, letters,
numbers that are unintelligible to anyone but software engineers.
When you take into account that products in the market today may
include over a million lines of this code, submitting 75 pages of that
code does nothing to enhance the collections of the Library of
Congress.230

But it is not just deposits of computer programs that are of questionable
utility. Many other types of works are likely to be of little or no value to the
Library of Congress. Nonetheless, copies must still be deposited in order to
obtain a federal registration and ultimately to permit timely enforcement of
one’s rights in the event of copyright infringement. The futility of this
situation was well-described back in 1993 by Olan Mills II, in connection with

227. See supra Section IV.A.2.i. (discussing the extensive exemptions under
Section 407).
228. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976).
229. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(C)(3) (citing H.R. REP. 941476, at 151 (1976)).
230. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 102–03 (testimony of
Enid Greene Waldholtz, Corporate Counsel, Novell, Inc.). Today, the number of
pages of source code that must generally be submitted is 50. 37 C.F.R. §
202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(1) (2019). This includes the first twenty-five pages and the last
twenty-five pages plus “the page of the source code that contains the copyright notice
(if any).” Id.
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a Senate Hearing considering legislation to repeal Section 411(a),231 but it still
rings true today:
I am told that the Library of Congress has expressed a concern that
repeal of [Section 411(a)] would deprive it of its ability to obtain
materials for its collections. I do not understand this concern. Several
years ago, our lawyer called the Copyright Office to ask whether we
should deposit copies of our output. We were advised quite clearly
that hundreds of thousands of Olan Mills photographs were not
wanted. The message was in essence, “don’t call us, we’ll call you.”
No one ever has. Olan Mills, Inc. (and I suspect most responsible
businesses) will provide the Library of Congress with any copies of
works that it wants. But we should not be required to flood it with
hundreds of thousands of portraits of no general interest to anyone.
Nor should we be mired in paperwork intended to facilitate such a
wasteful exercise.232

Objections of this kind to the Copyright Act’s current deposit
requirements are further amplified by the fact that the Library of Congress is
not required to add materials deposited under Section 408 to its collections
and can even be destroyed in accordance with Section 704, as discussed in
more detail in the next subsection.
iii. Section 704: Deposit and Destroy
Whether copies of works are submitted to the Copyright Office in
accordance with Section 407 or Section 408, the Copyright Act makes clear
that all materials deposited become the property of the United States, even
those works for which copyright registration is denied.233 Nonetheless,
despite the contention such materials are critical to the continued expansion
of the Library of Congress’ holdings, there is no requirement the works
actually be added to any of the Library’s collections.234 This is due to the fact
that Section 704 of the Copyright Act provides the Library of Congress with
the authority to decide which materials it wants to include in, or alternatively
exclude from, its collections.235
Deposits rejected by the Library of Congress are placed in government
storage facilities or otherwise retained under the control of the Copyright
Office.236 Pursuant to Section 704, material deposited in connection with an
unpublished work must be preserved for the full duration of its copyright term,
231. See supra Section II.C. (reviewing the proposed Copyright Reform Act of
1993).
232. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 181 (statement of Olan
Mills, II, Chairman of the Board, Olan Mills, Inc.).
233. 17 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2018).
234. §§ 704(b), (d); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.17(A).
235. §§ 704(b), (d).
236. § 704(d).
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while published works are to be held “for the longest period considered
practicable and desirable.”237 When the 1976 Copyright Act was initially
passed, the Copyright Office did not have any stated limits on the length of
time published works would be held under this statutory provision. However,
in 1983, a new policy was issued by the Copyright Office and approved by
the Librarian of Congress due to stated concerns regarding overall storage
space limitations and its related statutory obligations to retain unpublished
deposits for the term of the copyright.238 Consequently, the revised retention
schedule calls for maintaining published deposits for a period of only five
years.239 After this time not only is there is no further obligation to preserve
these works, but the Register of Copyright or the Librarian of Congress can
order the works to be discarded in accordance with Section 704(d).240 Clearly,
it is difficult to argue these deposit materials are vital to the continued
expansion of the Library of Congress collections.
iv. Arguable Inequities Associated with “Library Building”
Despite the discussion above concerning the perceived or actual loss that
could potentially occur through the repeal of Section 411(a), there still exists
the fundamental question of whether it is even proper to tie the deposit
requirement to the copyright registration process. This is especially true
because registration with the accompanying deposit as part of the application
is a mandatory step to the enforcement of one’s copyright in a given work at
present. The statement of the Business Software Alliance submitted in
connection with Senate hearings on the registration prerequisite reflects part
of this debate:
Mandatory registration is not necessary or appropriate as a means of
building the Library’s collections…There [is] a strong consensus that
Library acquisitions policy should not drive copyright registration
policy. In addition, the requirement that copyright registrants give up
copies of their works to the Library without compensation constitutes
a burden imposed on authors which is unrelated with the purpose of
the copyright system as provided in Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, to “promote progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights
to their respective writings and discoveries.241

237. Id.
238. Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862 (Mar.
28, 1983); see also 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Hughes).
239. 48 Fed. Reg. 12, 862 (Mar. 28, 1983).
240. Id.
241. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 178 (Statement of the
Business Software Alliance).
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Moreover, the Senate testimony of an individual artist further echoes and
expands on these concerns:
As American creators, we wish, of course, to have the richest possible
national library. But we see no reason to link the deposit of works in
the Library of Congress with copyright enforcement. Our copyright
law provides authors with an incentive to create by granting us
exclusive rights to license our words. Our ability to enforce these
rights, essential to making a living for us, should not be tied to the great
and worthy good of creating and maintaining a great national
library.242

There are no easy answers to the issue of how best to balance the
responsibilities and burdens associated with building a strong Library of
Congress. However, removing the Section 411(a) registration prerequisite
would likely be a good start. By doing so, those who wish to take advantage
of the benefits of registration could weigh the pros and cons of doing so with
the related costs of providing the required deposit copies and paying the filing
fee, not to mention the time connected with such endeavors. But the ability
to enforce one’s copyright in the federal court system would no longer be
connected to registration of the work with the Copyright Office and the
attendant costs of the application process. Additionally, such an approach
would be more in line with the policies of other nations.243 While some have
suggested additional congressional appropriations to fund the purchase of
materials for the Library of Congress,244 this is unlikely to be a viable solution
in light of the current economic and political situation in the United States.

B. Copyright Office as “Gatekeeper”
Another principal argument in opposition to the repeal of Section 411(a)
is the purported role it plays in preventing dubious copyright infringement
claims from entering the courthouse. The following is representative of this
line of reasoning:
242. Id. at 49 (Statement of Erica Jong).
243. Id. at 73 (Statement of Irwin Karp, Committee for Literary Property Studies:
“[N]o other nation in the world that has a copyright law, and many have brilliant and
formidable national libraries, none of them coerce depositing by requiring registration
as a condition for remedies. In fact, none of them have registration systems. We are
the only people in the world that continue to impose these formalities.”); Id. at 5
(Comments of Senator DeConcini: “The time has come for the Library to move in the
direction of the legal deposit systems upon which the national library systems of most
other countries are based.”).
244. See e.g., id. at 4–5 (Comments of Senator DeConcini: “We therefore propose
that first, Congress accept a comprehensive package of recommendations supporting
deposit acquisitions for the Library and the copyright registration system. This
package should be enacted as a whole and adequately funded and staffed if there are
to be changes in the copyright registration system.”).
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In the past, some suits have been kept out of court by the necessity of
filing for registration prior to institution of litigation and by the
unwillingness of potential plaintiffs to bring suit under section 411(a)
following a refusal to register because of the unfavorable light in
which a judge might view the refusal to register and the undesirability
of having the Copyright Office intervene in opposition. In a world
without section 411(a), it is likely that a greater number of suits would
be brought in Federal court. It certainly is no answer to permit the
Copyright Office to intervene in such suits. The Office should not be
forced into devoting (as would be the case) a substantial part of its
limited resources to litigation.245

While at first glance such sentiments might appear to be compelling,
further examination reveals a lack of evidentiary support for these claims.
Studies show over the last several decades, the Copyright Office receives on
average approximately 500,000 applications for registration each year246 and
typically registers between 98–99% of the works submitted for federal
copyright registration.247 Such statistics prompted one commentator to aptly
state: “It makes little sense to delay all cases for the sake of the 1 percent.”248
Additionally, in light of the fact that each year only about 2000 copyright
infringement lawsuits are filed, it is highly unlikely the elimination of the
registration prerequisite would have any significant effect on court dockets.249
In fact, data provided by the Copyright Office during a five-year period
reveals that “a total of thirteen infringement actions were filed . . . by
copyright claimants whose registration applications had been refused.”250
This suggests the repeal of Section 411(a) would increase the number of
infringement cases filed by only “two or three per annum.”251 This hardly
presupposes a reasonable likelihood of a “flood” of litigation.
Moreover, as indicated above,252 Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act
expressly allows an applicant to proceed with a copyright infringement action
even after a refusal by the Register of Copyrights to register a work.253
Consequently, the deterrent effect of Section 411(a) is exceptionally

245. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 43 (1988).
246. See e.g., UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORTS,
available at https://www.copyright.gov/history/annual_reports.html [perma.cc/65XM
-3BDN] (last visited May 9, 2020) (providing access to every annual report issued by
the Copyright Office since 1866).
247. Brief of the United States at 4 n.2, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010); see also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 7.16.
248. Id. at § 7.16 n.196.
249. Id.
250. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 21 (1988).
251. Id.
252. See supra Section II.A.
253. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018).
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limited,254 especially when the high registration rate and the small number of
actual cases filed are taken into consideration. Add to the calculation the
ability of courts to sanction plaintiffs who bring meritless claims, including in
copyright infringement cases the award of a defendant’s attorney’s fees, and
this further lessens the forcefulness of the argument Section 411(a) is
necessary to prevent frivolous litigation.255
Nonetheless, one ostensible advantage of the current system is that prior
to filing a copyright infringement suit on a work denied registration, the
applicant is required to serve notice on the Register of Copyrights and provide
a copy of the complaint.256 Additionally, pursuant to Section 411(a) of the
Copyright Act, the Register then has the “option [to] become a party to the
action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by
entering an appearance within sixty days after such service.”257 If litigants
were allowed to proceed without first registering their work, the Register of
Copyrights would not be apprised of an infringement suit in a manner similar
to rejected applicants under the current law. Although this would only affect
the exceptionally small percentage of works the Register has historically
refused to register, it may appear to be a potentially valid concern. However,
Section 508 of the Copyright Act ensures the Register of Copyrights will still
be apprised of the suit.258 The provision requires clerks of the courts of the
United States to send “[w]ithin one month after the filing of any action under
this title . . . the names and addresses of the parties and the title, author, and
registration number of each work involved in the action.”259 Alternatively, in
the unlikely event that reliance on Section 508 proved to be onerous or
inadequate, the issue could be easily resolved by requiring any party filing a
copyright infringement without the benefit of a copyright registration to serve
notice on the Register of Copyrights in the manner currently required under
Section 411(a) for applicants denied registration.
254. 139 CONG. REC. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes)
(“[I]t is argued that section 411(a) weeds out frivolous claims. The problem with this
argument is that section 411(a) permits claimants to file suit after a rejection. Thus, at
most, section 411(a) deters only the assertion of frivolous claims by those who are not
sufficiently determined to bring suit after a rejection.”).
255. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 116 (prepared statement
of Paul Batista, Executive Director of the Graphic Artists Guild, Inc.) (“There is no
merit to the suggestion that repeal of [Section 411(a)] will lead to an increase in
frivolous or harassing litigation. No small business person can risk valuable time and
resources pursuing a meritless infringement claim . . . . Furthermore, any plaintiff
asserting a frivolous or harassing claim in court would face the prospect of paying the
defendant’s attorney’s fees under Section 505. The courts have the power and
discretion to protect defendants from meritless claims, and they have not hesitated to
use that authority to sanction copyright plaintiffs where appropriate in the past.”).
256. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018); see also supra Section II.A. discussing the
addition of this portion of the provision.
257. § 411(a).
258. § 508.
259. Id.; see also, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-352, at 25 n.7 (1988).
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Aside from keeping out baseless claims and ensuring the Register of
Copyrights receives notice of pending copyright infringement cases,
proponents of Section 411(a) often argue the registration prerequisite also
streamlines the litigation process itself. For example, former Register of
Copyrights Ralph Oman has stated that “the requirement of registration as a
precondition of an infringement suit simplifies and expedites litigation . . .
[and] its elimination will be burdensome to the federal courts.”260 However,
the strength of this position is dramatically lessened by changes to copyright
law that have occurred over time.261 Modifications such as “the repeal of
mandatory formalities and the expansion of copyrightable subject” have
largely eradicated the force of any arguable screening function provided by
the Copyright Office.262
Furthermore, “Review of judicial opinions in infringement cases
suggests that courts largely make independent evaluations of issues of fact
and copyright validity rather than relying on certificates of registration.”263 In
many ways, this is not very surprising as Congress vested the federal courts
with the power to enforce copyright law, not the Copyright Office.264 As the
Ninth Circuit aptly stated, “the Register’s decision of whether or not to grant
a registration certificate is largely perfunctory”265 as the Register’s review is
limited to only determining whether “the material deposited is ‘copyrightable
subject matter’ and that the legal and formal requirements of the Copyright
Act are met.”266 Although a timely registration certificate provides prima
facie evidence of the validity of copyrightability and the facts contained
therein,267 it is ultimately the role of the courts to determine these issues.268

260. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 23 (1988).
261. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 30.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 24 (1988) (“[I]t is the courts, not the
Copyright Office, that interpret and apply the copyright law to disputes arising from
alleged infringements. While Congress could have chosen to give the Copyright
Office the power to conduct administrative proceedings to decide such disputes, it has
never done so. Rather, it has assigned that role to the courts, in adversary proceedings
in which one party shoulders the burden of proving his entitlement to relief.”).
265. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir.
2010).
266. Id. at 621 n.13 (“After the Register’s determination, the courts are
empowered to review any denial of a certificate, and approval by the Register gives
an applicant only prima facie evidence of copyright, leaving the courts to make the
ultimate determination in either instance.”).
267. 17 U.S.C § 410(c) (2018); see also supra Section IV.A.1.i (discussing prima
facie validity).
268. See e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, § 12.11(B)(3) (“Some courts,
even in infringement cases, although typically not expressing themselves in such
language, apparently defer to Copyright Office determinations of copyrightability
through issuance of a registration certificate. A few expressly take the determination
into their own hands. The most common pattern, however, is for courts adjudicating
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Moreover, courts are in no way constrained by the earlier determinations of
the Copyright Office’s decision to approve or deny registration of the work in
question.269 Consequently, the repeal of Section 411(a)’s registration
requirement is not only unlikely to create additional burdens on the court
system, but it would also have little to no impact on judicial practices in
copyright infringement actions.

C. Independent Justifications for the Elimination of Section 411(a)’s
Registration Requirement
Aside from the numerous deficiencies in the claims advanced by
proponents of Section 411(a) examined above, there are a few additional
rationales for repealing the prerequisite of federal copyright registration prior
to bringing a copyright infringement suit. First, dispensing with this portion
of Section 411(a) would allow individuals and entities to seek relief for
copyright infringement more expediently. This is particularly important
considering the continual technological advancements that have made the
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works less costly and much
easier. Second, the prerequisite is incongruent with the goal of global
harmonization, which has repeatedly been the motivation for so many of the
changes to domestic copyright law over the years. Moreover, the dual
treatment of U.S. and foreign works is also internally inconsistent and
similarly untenable. Maintaining a registration prerequisite for owners of U.S.
works conflicts with the general movement toward harmonization as the
United States essentially stands alone on this requirement. Third, Section
411(a) creates a peculiar inconsistency between copyright and trademark law,
which is arguably problematic due to the overlap between these two areas of
law and the frequency with which a single complaint includes claims for both
types of infringement.

1. Copyright Enforcement
Long gone are the days when an actual, tangible book needs to be
obtained and each page individually photocopied to reproduce the work, a
floppy disk acquired to download and duplicate a computer program, or a CD
attained to replicate an album. Instead, a perfect copy can be made quickly

infringement actions simply to reach their own determinations, without adverting
either to the agency’s general level of expertise or to the Copyright Office’s particular
determination via its issuance (or denial) of a certificate.”) (citing I.C. ex rel. Solovsky
v. Delta Galil USA, 135 F. Supp. 3d 196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
269. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 24 (1988) (“[U]nder current law, the courts
are already required to undertake an independent determination of copyrightability.
Courts can – and do – decide that, despite the issuance of a registration certificate, the
plaintiff is not entitled to claim the protection of the copyright laws, just as they can –
and do – decide that the Office’s refusal to issue a registration certificate does not
foreclose the plaintiff from proving that the work is copyrightable.”).
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and easily disseminated around the world almost instantaneously.
Additionally, widespread reproductions of copyrighted works can often be
completed on a large-scale at very little cost as a result of extensive
technological advancements. Consequently, expeditious access to the courts
to remedy infringements has become essential.
One of the benefits and leading rationales for many courts that adopted
the application approach270 was that it avoided “unnecessary delay in
copyright infringement litigation, which could permit an infringing party to
continue to profit from its wrongful acts.”271 As a result of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Fourth Estate, copyright owners that may not have
registered their work prior to the acts of infringement272 are once again thrown
into a “legal limbo” in which they have copyright protection but no means to
timely enforce such rights.273 As even the Supreme Court noted in its Fourth
Estate decision, the registration process is far from prompt. The Court
observed that while copyright registration processing times used to be from
one to two weeks in the 1950s,274 today it takes on average seven months.275
As such, the Court acknowledged the “statutory scheme has not worked as
Congress likely envisioned.”276 The Court also noted these delays were
largely attributable “to staffing and budgetary shortages” that Congress cannot
Nevertheless, while the Court described the situation as
cure.277
“unfortunate,” it also held this “factor does not allow us to revise § 411(a)’s
congressionally composed text.”278
The Court provided a somewhat conciliatory suggestion, namely
utilizing the Copyright Office’s expedited claims service.279 In circumstances
such as pending or prospective litigation, the Copyright Office does allow
copyright claimants to request special handling that typically provides a very
quick turnaround, usually no more than five working days.280 Unfortunately,
the option of expediting an application is not a real solution to the problem,
as it comes at a prohibitively high price for many – an additional $800 fee per

270. See supra Section III.A (examining the application approach in detail).
271. Cosmetic Ideas Inc., 606 F.3d at 619.
272. See supra Section II.C (discussing some of the practical and financial
impediments to copyright registration).
273. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620 (“The application approach avoids this
legal limbo – and avoids prolonging the period of infringement – by allowing a litigant
to proceed with an infringement suit as soon as he has taken all of the necessary steps
to register the copyright at issue.”).
274. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881,
886 (2019).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 892.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 892 n.6.
280. Id.
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work;281 plus there is no guarantee the application will be processed in such
an accelerated manner. One commentator appropriately characterized this
“alternative” as follows:
[F]ew copyright claimants are aware of the expedited procedure; the
procedure itself is costly; and, even if pursued, the expedited procedure
does not ensure the prompt issuance or denial of a certificate if the
Copyright Office chooses to engage in protracted correspondence with
the applicant before definitively accepting or rejecting the
application.282

Furthermore, the expedited process doesn’t solve the more fundamental
problem faced by all copyright owners of domestic works, namely an inability
to obtain prompt and equal access to the federal court system, especially when
preliminary relief may be warranted.
Section 502 of the Copyright Act provides for “temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain
infringement of a copyright.”283 Such relief may be particularly important in
clear cases of piracy or situations where it might be especially difficult to
ascertain the full extent of copying, thereby making it all but impossible to
determine an appropriate monetary damage award.284 Moreover, in some
instances, an injunction is even more valuable to a copyright owner than any
sort of financial remuneration for losses incurred from the infringement.285
This is attributable to the fact that “[t]he exigencies of copyright litigation
often require the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order,
followed by a temporary injunction, upon the discovery of an infringing
copy.”286 Of course, injunctive relief is not appropriate in every copyright
infringement case. It is exceptionally important that other factors be
considered, most notably the potential existence of fair use, the possible
conflict with the First Amendment, and the impact on the public domain.287
Nonetheless, “Issuance of injunctive relief is a long-standing remedy in U.S.

281. Id.
282. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
283. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2018).
284. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles
Project: Directions for Reform 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1223–24 (2010).
285. See e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,
1199–1200 (Stating that in terms of remedies available under the Copyright Act,
“perhaps most important, a registrant can obtain an injunction against an infringer.”).
286. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 185 (Draft Working
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
287. See Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1223–24; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 98, § 14.06(A)(1)(c); Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use:
Enter eBay – Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom, 55 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449, 460 (2008).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss2/19

46

Davik: Unregistered Complaints

2020]

UNREGISTERED COMPLAINTS

403

copyright law, and that is as it should be.”288 But for U.S. copyright owners
that discover their work has been infringed prior to registration, they cannot
immediately gain access to the courthouse due to the registration prerequisite.
Furthermore, absent repeal of Section 411(a)’s stipulation, the attendant wait
associated with the registration process and the inability to obtain a
preliminary injunction may make it impossible to achieve fair remuneration
for the harms suffered, as “justice delayed will often mean justice denied.”289

2. Inconsistencies: Inside and Out
As previously discussed,290 in order to become a member of the Berne
Convention, the United States was required to amend its copyright laws to
remove all prohibited formalities against nationals from other Berne
Convention member nations, including Section 411(a)’s registration
prerequisite. However, due to a peculiarity of the Berne Convention,291 there
is no such requirement that U.S. nationals be treated as favorably.292
Consequently, while an owner of a foreign work can bring a copyright
infringement suit immediately, an owner of a U.S. work must not only apply
for federal registration but, following the Fourth Estate case, must actually
wait until the Copyright Office has determined whether or not the work is
entitled to registration. At the time, Congress could have removed the
precondition of registration for all copyright owners but ultimately decided
against this course of action.
As such, owners of U.S. works shoulder the burdens and harms
associated with Section 411(a)’s requirement. Perhaps not surprisingly, this
bifurcated approach has been described as “demoralizing” and
“discriminatory.”293 Moreover, this incongruous differentiation between
domestic and international works may put U.S. copyright owners at a

288. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1223.
289. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 64, at 185 (Draft Working
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
290. See supra Section II.B. (Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988); see
also supra Section II.C. (Copyright Reform Act of 1993).
291. See e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 98, §17.01 (B)(1)(a) (“[T]he
Convention does not purport to govern the scope of formalities that a country may
place on its own nationals to secure copyright protection.”) (citing Berne Convention
(Paris text), art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy . . . in countries of the Union other than the
country of origin . . . .”)).
292. See Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 186–87 (Draft
Working Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School); id. at 30
(Report of Co-Chairs Barbara Ringer and Robert Wedgeworth, Library of Congress
Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit).
293. Hearing on Copyright Reform Act, supra note 79, at 176, 187 (Draft Working
Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
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competitive disadvantage294 without any “real countervailing benefits to the
United States copyright system.”295
The dual standard is particularly untenable given the purposeful
movement of U.S. copyright law toward increasing international
harmonization over the past fifty years. For example, many of the revisions
made as part of the 1976 Copyright Act296 and the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988297 were designed to position “American
copyright law on a footing similar to most other countries, especially in the
industrial world” and as a result “our domestic law as well as the international
legal system [would be] improved.”298 Relatedly, in 1998, the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) was enacted, which, among other
things, extended the duration of copyright protection in the United States by
twenty years.299 As a result, a work created today by an individual artist is
granted a copyright term of the life of the author plus seventy years, as
opposed to the previous length of life of the author plus fifty years.300
Proponents of the CTEA greatly emphasized the need to harmonize U.S. law
with a similar change made in the European Union a few years earlier.301
It is worth noting the requirement of registration prior to instituting suit
cannot be attributed to harmonization as it was atypical of other countries’
copyright laws prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 and
continues to be so today. Elimination of the registration requirement for all is
therefore necessary to equalize the current imbalance in the treatment of U.S.
copyright owners. Such a change would also result in the United States finally
becoming aligned with international law on this issue. Consequently, the
United States would no longer stand out as an anomaly, something domestic
copyright law has ostensibly tried to avoid over the last five decades.

3. Intersection Between Trademarks and Copyrights
While copyright law and trademark law are distinct areas of intellectual
property law, there is a significant overlap between the two. Unlike patent
law which requires a determination by the United States Patent and Trademark

294. Id. at 176 (Statement of the Business Software Alliance).
295. Id. at 185 (Draft Working Paper of Paul L. Goldstein, Professor, Stanford
Law School).
296. See supra Section II.A (Promulgating Section 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright
Act).
297. See supra Section II.B (Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988).
298. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7 (1988).
299. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
300. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018) (“Duration of copyright: Works created on or after
January 1, 1978”).
301. Council of the European Communities, Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29
October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, (1993)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1993/98/oj [perma.cc/77UB-9E7C].
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Office (“USPTO”) that the property is protectable prior to a grant of rights,302
copyright law and trademark law do not require such a determination. A
trademark is potentially protectable once it is used in commerce in connection
with the sale of the goods or services.303 Although there are clear benefits
from federal trademark registration, it is by no means required. As such, if a
trademark owner discovers the mark has been infringed, a trademark
infringement claim can be filed immediately in federal court.304 In other
words, there is no need to wait for the USPTO to pass on the sufficiency and
protectability of the mark at issue prior to instituting a lawsuit.
Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, the mere fact
that a work is protectable under one area of intellectual property law does not
preclude protection under another area.305 It is not uncommon, “especially
with respect to logos,” for a “given work to be protected by independent
copyright and trademark rights.”306 However, if the work has not been
previously registered under copyright law, the owner can only proceed with
the trademark claim. Consequently, even if it would have been otherwise
warranted, the delay will likely result in a “forfeit[ure of] the right to an
immediate temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief” on the
copyright claim.307 While this predicament may not be a sufficient reason to
amend Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, it is yet another example of the
many shortcomings associated with the registration prerequisite.

D. Formalities: Back to the Future
Despite the historic shift away from formalities as a result of the global
harmonization of copyright law generally and U.S. movement toward
accession to membership in the Berne Convention specifically, there has been
a contemporary push for their reintroduction. While a comprehensive review
of the academic literature advocating for the reestablishment of various types
of copyright formalities and rationales for their use is beyond the scope of this
302. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (2018) (“Inventions patentable”).
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018) (“False designation of origin, false descriptions,
and dilution forbidden”).
304. Id.
305. See e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“We do hold that the
patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as
works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable it may not be copyrighted.”); see also INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, Board
Resolutions: Copyright Registration as a Precondition of Infringement Suit,
https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/BR20171107.aspx [perma.cc/G9HA-NVD5]
(last accessed June 12, 2019) (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6.5 (4th ed. 2016) (“The courts have
generally held that patent, trademark and copyright are separate and independent
forms of protection. As a general principle, the presence or absence of one does not
automatically preclude protection under another.”).
306. INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 305.
307. Id.
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Article, an examination of the primary arguments put forth for a renewed
emphasis on the requirement of registration is particularly relevant. Although
many of the concerns raised are valid, conditioning copyright rights on
registration, at least in its current form, is imprudent.
Much of the ardor for the return of formalities, especially the
requirement of registration, is due in large part to the significant increase in
both the breadth and length of copyright rights which is heightened by the
earlier shift in copyright law to an “automatic protection regime.”308 As one
scholar noted, “[c]opyright has historically been a limited right. Yet today
these limits have expanded to an unprecedented scope.”309 Relatedly, a report
issued by the Copyright Principles Project (“CPP”), a group made up of law
professors and lawyers from both private practices and within the copyright
industry, maintained that “the duration of copyright nowadays is longer than
is needed to achieve the normative goals of a good copyright regime” and
“[t]he switch to a life-plus-years model and the twenty-year extension have
contributed” to a number of growing problems.310
Among the cited complications engendered by these changes is the issue
of so-called “orphan works.” As the CPP report explained, “those wishing to
license older works often cannot locate the rights holders even after a
reasonably diligent search” which “inhibits appropriate reuses of older works
that may be important to preserve as part of our cultural heritage.”311
Similarly, even for modern works, “there is no simple way to distinguish
between those works whose authors care about copyright protection and those
who do not” as rights attach for all copyrightable works immediately upon
creation.312 As a result of these developments, scholars have understandably
raised concerns about the imbalance this has produced between the public
interest and the rights of copyright owners. In doing so, many have also
credited formalities with previously preventing or at least lessening such
harms arising from current copyright policy.313
For instance, as one commentator observed, “[f]or nearly two centuries,
U.S. copyright law relied on statutory formalities,” including filing a
registration with the government, in an attempt to create balance.314 The CPP
report similarly noted that registration “made it relatively simple for persons
who were interested in licensing certain uses of protected works to check the
central registry for contact information about the copyright owners.”315
308. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186.
309. Reid, supra note 18, at 427.
310. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1185.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1198.
313. Reid, supra note 18, at 427; see also, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 284,
at 1185–87; Carroll, supra note 18, at 1511; Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The
Future of United States Copyright Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize
Recordation, and How To Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459 (2013).
314. Reid, supra note 18, at 427.
315. Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186.
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Additionally, the CPP report cautioned that as a result of this
“deformalization,” potentially beneficial reuses of many copyrighted works
are inhibited.316 Consequently, the CPP report proffered “a more robust
registration system” and a “‘reformalizing’ [of] copyright law.”317
While none of the various proposals to “re-incentivize” registration
suggested a return to the strict rules of the past which could easily lead to a
work falling into the public domain for even a minor error or omission, all of
them included the loss of certain rights or provided additional defenses to the
alleged infringer for failing to register the work at issue.318 For example, the
CPP report suggested that infringement could “be found for copying of nonliteral elements of registered works but not for such copying as to unregistered
works.”319 Relatedly, “[r]egistered rights holders might also be able to sue to
stop certain non-commercial exploitations of a work likely to have market
impairing effects,”320 while unregistered works would only be protected from
“exact or near-exact that would cause commercial harm.”321 Furthermore, fair
uses could be defined differently as between registered and unregistered
works, with the latter more broadly construed.322 Other scholars have
suggested alternative approaches, including allowing users of an unregistered
work “to rely on an innocent infringer defense when facing a claim for
infringement.”323
Although the goal of ensuring there are “reasonable ways for the public
to get information about who owns which rights in which works and whether
works are or are not available for use or are in the public domain,”324 is both
a laudable and imperative objective, achieving it through the formality of
federal registration and a threat of limited enforcement is problematic. As
earlier discussed in great detail, there are numerous barriers to registration in
its current form, especially for individual artists or smaller entities. One
scholar fittingly described the effect of such formalities as “shield[ing] large
copyright owners who routinely comply with formalities from the
infringement claims of smaller copyright owners, particularly individual
authors, who may lack the information or resources systematically to register
and deposit their works.”325 Additionally, for those creating numerous works
in a short period of time, the ability to identify which ones could be
commercially successful and warrant a copyright registration prior to
infringement is virtually impossible to predict. While at some point in the
future we might have the ability to simply and quickly federally register a
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Reid, supra note 18, at 428.
Samuelson et al., supra note 284, at 1186.
Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 314.
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copyrightable work, or alternatively place all relevant information about it in
a publicly accessible database, we are unfortunately not quite there yet.326 In
the meantime, the use of such copyright registration formalities should at least
for now remain a thing of the past.

V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate Public Benefit
Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC goes beyond merely settling the split
among U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding the definition of registration for
purposes of satisfying Section 411(a)’s precondition. Instead, it should serve
as a clarion call for a much-needed amendment to the Copyright Act. By
repealing the provision’s registration prerequisite, a U.S. copyright owner of
an unregistered works will no longer be left with a right without a remedy.

326. See e.g., Carroll, supra note 18, at 1522 (2013) (“Digital technologies offer
opportunities to make affixing notice to a work or registering an author’s claim to
copyright in a database trivially easy in places with ready computer and Internet
access.”).
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